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Civil MO. 924400816 
Judge: 
~ oooOOOooo—-—— 
The above-entitled natter cane before the court, 
Commissioner Howard Haetani presiding, for consideration of the 
Cohabitant Abuse Order and the Orders to Show Cause of each of the 
parties, on Tuesday, the 2nd day of June, 1992. The Plaintiff was 
present in person represented by counsel, Marilyn Moody Brown. The 
Defendant was present in person represented by counsel, David 6. 
Dolofltz. The court heard and considered the arguments of counsel, 
examined the exhibits and pleadings filed by counsel on behalf of 
the parties, listened to the stipulations of the parties and heard 
the testimony of Barbara Bair of the Division of Family Services, 
determined to accept the stipulations of the parties and being 
advised in the premises as to the matters in issue, makes the 
following recommendations which pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
6-401 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration are entered as 
the Order of this court. 
XV Ifi HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED thatt 
1. Bach of the parties is enjoined and prohibited from 
physically or verbally harassing, abusing* injuring, or annoying 
the other party or the minor children of the parties at any time or 
at any place during the pendency of this natter. Bach of the 
parties is enjoined and prohibited from going on or about the 
premises of the other. The Protective Order previously Issued by 
the court is continued In full force and effect for its statutory 
duration except as nodifled herein. 
2. The Plaintiff and the Defendant are each enjoined 
and prohibited from making any negative or derogatory comments 
about the other party to the minor children of the parties at any 
time or place. 
3. Temporary care, custody and control of McCade, the 
minor child of the parties and Lindsay and Soott, the minor 
children of the Plaintiff from a prior marriage, is awarded to the 
Defendant as Barbara Balr, a social worker from the Division of 
Family Services on behalf of that agency, has spoken with the minor 
children of the parties and determined that Scott has advised her 
that his father, the Plaintiff, tried to choke him on three 
occasions and he is afraid of him? that Lindsay has advised her 
that her father, the Plaintiff, choked her on at least one occasion 
and she is afraid of him; that both of the children stated that 
2 
their father, the Plaintiff, takes actions which make them 
emotionally afraid of bin and they are afraid to go with him. The 
Plaintiff maintained that these ideas come from the Defendant* 
4, The Division of Family Services is ordered to 
continue the investigation of child abuse which it commenced on 
April 21, 1992 after the cohabitant Abuse Order was issued in this 
matter and to finish their evaluation and analyses as to whether or 
not either the Plaintiff or the Defendant has abused children. The 
Division of Family Services is further ordered to monitor 
visitation of the Plaintiff with the children and help coordinate 
arranging a supervised visit between the children and the Plaintiff 
through Shirley Reynolds, then to report back to the court so the 
court can determine what further orders are appropriate in regard 
to visitation; for example, should the court adopt standard 
visitation or limit visitation in some fashion and assist the court 
in a determination as to whether or not a guardian ad litem should 
be appointed for the children. 
5. Each of the parties is enjoined and prohibited from 
taking any action to secrete, dissipate, encumber or take any 
action that may Impair or decrease the value of the real or 
pereonal property of the parties during the pendency of this action 
specifically including the art work which is in the home, provided, 
however, the Defendant having been permitted to run the business of 
the Flying NN* Stables, is permitted to sell assets such as hay, 
livestock and horses in the operation of that business but she must 
account to the Plaintiff and ultimately the court, for her 
3 
operation of that business. 
6* The parties, through their counsel, shall Inventory 
the art collection which ie maintained in the home the uae of which 
the court is awarding to the Plaintiff, as soon as possible. The 
art shall remain in its present location. 
7. The Defendant shall have the use and possession of 
the home at 11075 Loafer Canyon Road, Salem, Utah. The Plaintiff 
is enjoined and prohibited from coming on or about that property. 
The property is to be listed for sale and, if possible, the parties 
are to sell that home. 
8. The Plaintiff is awarded use and possession of the 
1982 Suburban and the 1985 Toyota Supra. The Defendant is awarded 
the use and possession of the 1986 Toyota Forerunner and the 1990 
Chevrolet Pickup Truck. 
9. The Plaintiff is ordered to maintain the health, 
life, dental, homeowners and automobile insurance for the parties 
during the pendency of this action. Each of the parties shall pay 
one-half of any uninsured medical, dental, orthodontic, counseling 
or eye care expenses incurred for and on behalf of the minor 
children, 
10. The Defendant shall remove from the home of the 
parties and provide to the Plaintiff the Plaintiff's personal 
effects and those items of property which she agrees are his and 
should be awarded to him. 
11. The Defendant shall operate the business known as 
the Plying miam Stables subject to accounting for its profit or 
4 
loss. In sixty (60) days counsel for the parties* should the 
Plaintiff so desire, shall contact the court and review the 
situation in regard to the business operation of the Flying "IP 
Stables and whether it should continue to operate, be shut down, 
sold or any other action taken other than permitting the Defendant 
to operate it. 
12. The RV and boat shall be sold. The net proceeds of 
sale shall be used to pay debts of the parties as they agree* If 
they do not agree, these funds snail be hold in escrow pending 
further order of the court. 
13. The parties are each ordered to consult a therapist 
and counsel with their therapist and working with the custody 
evaluator, jointly choose a therapist for the children. 
14. Dr. Elizabeth Stewart is appointed as the custody 
evaluator by the court to perform a custody evaluation in this 
matter. The Plaintiff shall pay for the services of Dr, Stewart. 
Dr. Stewart when she completes her report shall file the original 
with the court and provide copies to counsel for eaoh of the 
parties, provided, however, said coolqa ar* confidential and a*« 
not to be shown to anv patrson gp party, but are made available to 
counsel solely for their convenience in advising their clients in 
this matter. Should this action go to trial, counsel for the 
parties shall consult with Dr. Stewart and determine what portions, 
if any, of the report may be shown to the clients as preparation 
for and the conducting of trial. With Dr. Stewart' a permission, in 
the event of trial, the reports may be shown to the clients as she 
5 
has advised counsel. 
15. The Plaintiff has one million ($1,000,000,00) 
Dollars in life insurance. He shall continue that in full force 
and effect. Three Hundred Thousand ($300,000*00) Dollars of that 
insurance shell be designated to the Defendant as beneficiary in 
the event of the Plaintiff's death. The children shall be 
designated as beneficiaries of the remaining S^vt^n Hundred Thousand 
($700,000*00) Dollars in the following portions: $100,000.00 for 
Travis; $200,000.00 for Lindsay; $200,000.00 for HcCade; 
$200,000. 00 for 8cott. 
16. The parties own a condominium on the island of Maui. 
That condominium shall be listed for sale and sold. The net 
proceeds of sale shall be utilised to pay debts of the parties as 
they mutually agree. In the absence of agreement, the net proceeds 
of 8ale shall be placed in escrow and held until further order of 
the court. 
17. The parties own a condominium in St. George, Utah. 
The Plaintiff shall continue making the payments on that 
condominium. The parties shall share the rights to use the 
condominium with the Defendant having the right to make first 
choice and fourth choice as to which two weeks of the year she 
shall use. The remainder shall be awarded to the Plaintiff. 
18. The court has determined that the Plaintiff had a 
gross monthly Income during 1992 of $35,600.00 per month. After 
withholding of taxes he has a net income of $24,444,60. The 
Plaintiff filed with the oourt a debt schedule which included 
6 
making the house payments and many of those debts which the 
Defendant had included in her request for support* The monthly 
payments on that schedule total $15/866. 29. 
19. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay the marital debts as 
he listed them on the exhibit given to the court, a copy of which 
is attached hereto. They total $15,866.29 per month* The 
Plaintiff is ordered to make those payments and hold the Defendant 
harmless therefrom* As debts will be paid, the disposal net income 
of the Plaintiff will increase* Accordingly, the Defendant is 
free/ after payment of some of these debts, to request the oourt to 
re-examine the support ordors hereinafter entered. 
20. In setting child support, the oourt finds that the 
Plaintiff has a gross income of $35,600.00 per month. Based 
thereon child support is set in the sum of $3, 900* 00 per month for 
the three (3) children, McCade, Scott and Lindsay. As the 
Plaintiff has included insurance in his list of expenses, no 
additional credit is given to him against the award for this 
purpose. 
21. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff 
alimony in the sum of $800.00 per month provided, however/ the 
Defendant is free to return to court to seek additional alimony 
when the debts of the parties have been paid down sufficiently so 
that the Plaintiff will have additional disposable income or should 
she determine, as a result of discovery, that the Plaintiff has 
income above and beyond that which was presented to the court in 
the exhibits presented to the court, copies of which are attached 
7 
hereto. 
22. The Plaintiff has requested possession of certain 
business /partnership, family records which are in the home of the 
parties. The Defendant has agreed to supply them, but requested an 
opportunity to copy them before transmitting. They are to be 
copied and transmitted within the next ten (10) days. 
23. The Defendant requested the court for support 
retroactive to May 1, 1992, based on requesting the hearing In this 
matter initially on Nay 12/ 1992 and continuing it until June 2, 
1992. The Court has determined that some payment was made on 
behalf of the Defendant during May and therefore directs that the 
Plaintiff pay one-half of the ordered child support, that is, 
$400.oo in alimony and $1,950. 00 as child support for the month of 
May, which the Plaintiff said he would pay immediately. This 
should be paid on or before June 5, 1992. 
24. Child support and alimony payment* ordered by this 
court shall be paid one-half on the Sth day of each month, and one-
half on the 20th day of each month* Accordingly, the Plaintiff 
shall pay $400. 00 as alimony to the Plaintiff on the Sth of each 
month and $400.00 as alimony on the 20th of each month and 
$1,950.00 as child support on the Sth day of eaoh month and 
$1,950.00 on the 20th of each month, commencing on the 5th day of 
June, 1992. 
25. The Defendant' s request for attorney' e fees and suit 
money is reserved, at this point, for further ruling when the 
financial status of the parties is more clear. 
8 
26. She Plaintiff clalned that the Defendant had in her 
possession a pager. The Defendant stated that this had been 
returned to the Plaintiff. The pager is to be returned to the 
Plaintiff, if it has not been so returned. If the Defendant 
discovers another pager, or the pager in question, she shall 
forthwith have it delivered to the Plaintiff. 
DATED this K day of S^fr*^-^ 1992. 
BT THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
AND CONTENT: 
MARILYN MOODY BROWN, Counsel 
for Plaintiff 
SIONER JfOWARD H. MASTANX 
"LW^^X 





I hereby oertlfy that I caused to be nailed this _if_Tday 
of June, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to 
the following individualx 
Marilyn Moody Brown 
ROBINSON, 5EILS&, GLAZIER « BRON» 
80 North 100 Baat 
P.O. Box 1266 
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C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Utah Bar #5455 
P.O. Box 243 
405 East State Road 
American Fork, Utah, 84003 
(801) 756-0554 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
DAVID WARREN WATSON, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
SUZANNE WATSON, ] 
Defendant. ] 
• PROTECTIVE ORDER WITH 
> OTHER TEMPORARY ORDERS 
i Civil No. 924400816 
) Commissioner Howard Maetani 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the Honorable 
Judge Steven Hansen on October 28, 1993, for hearing on the issue 
of a protective order in Case Number 934401861 and upon Defendant's 
order to Show Cause in this action, the parties appearing in person 
and with their respective attorneys of record, the parties having 
stipulated as to some issues, the parties having reserved some 
issues and the Court having ruled as to other issues, the Court 
having reviewed the files and records herein, the pleadings in the 
two (2) 1993 cases and in this matter, and deeming itself fully 
advised, finds the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties have agreed that the order of this Court 
ORIGINAL 
signed June 8, 1992, in this case (Case Number 924400816) remains 
in full force and effect until modified by the Court, Child 
support and alimony under the June 8, 1992, order shall be 
effective with the month of August 1993, with no assessment of 
arrearage prior to August 1993. 
2. The parties have agreed that Plaintiff shall pay full 
child support and alimony from this time forward without deduction 
for any claimed off sets. 
3. The parties have informed the Court that there is a 
dispute as to child support and alimony arrearage from August 1993 
to present due to some off sets claimed by Plaintiff against child 
support and alimony. The parties have agreed that Plaintiff shall 
pay $500 toward the claimed arrearage within the next five (5) days 
and that any remaining issue regarding arrearage will be resolved 
at the next scheduled hearing on November 16, 1993. 
4. The parties have informed the Court that Defendant 
presently has custody of the parties minor child and Plaintiff's 
children from a prior marriage. Plaintiff has informed the Court 
that he desires that his children from a prior marriage be placed 
in the custody of his sister and her family in Nevada. Defendant 
has informed the Court that the children and Doctor Gail Stringham 
recommend against this until a full custody evaluation is 
completed. The parties have agreed that Doctor Elizabeth Stewart of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, shall be appointed as a custody evaluator and 
that Plaintiff shall arrange for payment of her costs and fees. As 
to Plaintiff's children by a former marriage, the parties have 
agreed that Plaintiff's sister and her family may be involved as 
part of the evaluation to determine if such placement is in the 
children's best interest of these children. 
5. Plaintiff has stipulated that a protective order may 
enter against him in favor of Defendant, but has requested that any 
protective order be mutual. Defendant has objected to a mutual 
protective order and the parties have agreed to leave resolution of 
this issue to the court. 
6. The parties have agreed that Defendant will process an 
insurance claim for the death of one (1) of the horses as soon as 
possible and that when the funds are received which are expected to 
be approximately $50,000, the funds will be placed in the trust 
account of C. ROBERT COLLINS until further order of the Court or 
agreement of the parties. 
7. The parties have agreed that there is approximately 
$30,000 due from the Internal Revenue Service for the 1992 tax 
return and that these funds should be received within the next four 
(4) to six (6) weeks. When these funds are received, they will be 
placed in the trust account of SAMUEL McVEY. From these funds, Mr. 
McVey shall pay to himself on behalf of Plaintiff the sum of 
$5000.00 for attorney's fees. Mr. McVey shall also pay to C. 
ROBERT COLLINS on behalf of Defendant the sum of $5,000 for 
attorney's fees. The balance of these funds shall be held in Mr. 
McVey's trust account until further order of the Court or agreement 
of the parties. 
8. The parties have agreed that 32 acres of range property 
may be sold by Defendant upon receipt of an acceptable offer 
approved by both parties and that these funds shall be placed in 
the trust account of one (1) of the attorneys until agreement of 
the parties or further order of the Court. 
9. The parties have agreed that all personal items belonging 
to one party, but in the possession of the other such as clothes, 
fashion accessories, etc., shall be turned over to the party to 
whom it belongs thought counsel. 
10. The parties have agreed that any and all other issues 
between the parties may be considered by the Court at the November 
16, 1993, hearing before Commissioner Howard Maetani. 
10. The Court has determined that the protective order should 
be mutual due to allegations of aggression against both parties. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that: 
A. The order of this Court signed June 8, 1992, in Case 
Number 924400816 shall be and is hereby determined to be in full 
force and effect until modified by the Court. 
B. Child support and alimony under the June 8, 1993, order 
shall be effective August 1993, with no assessment of arrearage 
prior to August 1993. 
C. Plaintiff shall pay all future child support and alimony 
without deduction for off sets he may claim. Whether or not either 
party is entitled to off sets shall be reserved for further order 
of the Court. 
D. Plaintiff shall pay $500 toward the child support 
arrearage claimed by Defendant within the next five (5) days. The 
remaining arrearage claim shall be reserved for resolution at the 
next scheduled hearing on November 16, 1993. 
E. Doctor Elizabeth Stewart of Salt Lake City, Utah, shall 
be and is hereby appoint as a custody evaluator. Plaintiff shall 
arrange for payment of her costs and fees. Plaintiff's sister and 
her family may be involved as part of the evaluation to determine 
whether or not Plaintiff's children by a prior marriage should be 
placed in her custody. 
F. Defendant shall process the insurance claim for the death 
of one (1) of the horses as soon as possible and when the funds are 
received, those funds shall be placed in the trust account of C. 
ROBERT COLLINS until further order of the Court or agreement of the 
parties. 
G. The refund from the Internal Revenue Service for the 1992 
tax return shall be placed in the trust account of SAMUEL McVEY. 
From these funds, Mr. McVey shall pay to himself on behalf of 
Plaintiff the sum of $5000.00 for attorney's fees. Mr. McVey shall 
also pay from these funds to C. ROBERT COLLINS on behalf of 
Defendant the sum of $5,000 for attorney's fees. The balance of 
these funds shall be held in Mr. McVey's trust account until 
further order of the Court or agreement of the parties. 
H. The 32 acres of range property may be sold by Defendant 
upon receipt of an acceptable offer approved by both parties and 
the funds received from this sale shall be placed in the trust 
account of one (1) of the attorneys until agreement of the parties 
or further order of the Court. 
I. Any other issues between the parties may be considered by 
the Court on November 16, 1993 at the order to show cause hearing 
scheduled before Commissioner Howard Maetani. 
J. There shall be mutual protective orders entered between 
the parties. 
K. All personal items belonging to one party, but in the 
possession of the other such as clothes, fashion accessories, etc., 
shall be turned over to the party to whom it belongs thought 
counsel. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that neither of the parties shall cause, 
attempt to cause, or threaten physical harm to the other at any 
time or place. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall stay away from 
resident or dwelling place of the other and the others place of 
employment. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
*3U^ 
the protective order provision herein shall be effective for a 
period of 120 days from the date hereon. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no further service of this order on 
either parties needs to be made since both parties were present in 
court when this order was issued by the Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the protective order in favor of 
Defendant and against Plaintiff shall also apply to the minor child 
of the parties, Defendant's minor child and the minor children of 
Plaintiff in Defendant's custody/^^f^t^ftf^ O^^^e ^ ^ ^ ^ 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties shall be and are 
hereby restrained from engaging in molesting, threatening, 
harassing or annoying behavior toward the other in any matter 
during the pendency of this action. 
NOTICE: Violation of the protective orders set forth herein 
may result in immediate arrest and in criminal charges being 
brought against the party violating,? these orders. 
Dated and signed this day of November/ 1993.' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was sent by facsimile transmission and mailed, postage 
prepaid on the 28th day of October, 1993, to Plaintiff's Attorney 
and again with agreed upon corrections of the 3rd day of November, 
1993, at: 
SAMUEL D. MCVEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT., 84111 
C- ROBERT COLLINS 
Tab 3 
F O U R T H JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
U T A H COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH RLE) 
125 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1847 
Provo, UT 84603 
DATE: July 18, 1994 ^ ' v 
The Fourth Judicial District Court is rerumiiiH to you the enclosed document(s) for 
the following reasons: 
Judge Harding did not sign the Order to Show Cause as he wishes to deal with the 
property and alimony issues when the other issues are resolved in Juvenile Court. Judge 
Hansen didn't sign the documents as this matter is no longer before him. 
Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact this office at 
(801) 429-1039. 
Carma B. Smith 
Clerk of the Court 
Deputy Clerk 
11 
Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID WARREN WATSON, : 
: MOTION FOR ORDER TO 
Plaintiff, : SHOW CAUSE 
vs. : Civil No. 924400816 
Judge Raymond M. Harding 
SUZANNE WATSON, : 
Defendant. : 
Plaintiff David W. Watson, by and through his counsel of record, hereby moves 
this Court for an order requiring defendant Suzanne Watson to appear before the 
above-entitled Court at the Fourth Judicial District Courthouse, 125 North 100 West, 
Provo, Utah, Room 201, on the 14th day of July, 1994 at the hour of 10:00 a.m., then 
and there to show cause, if any she may have, why the following relief should not be 
granted: 
(1) Why plaintiffs temporary alimony obligation should not be eliminated in 
light of the fact that plaintiff is unemployed and has thus far been unable to find even 
temporary employment. 
(2) Why unnecessary and unutilized assets of the marital estate should not be 
liquidated with the proceeds applied to paying off the enormous debt load of the 
marital estate. 
(3) Why plaintiff should not be solely authorized to sell said assets provided 
all sale proceeds be placed in trust pending final resolution of this matter. 
(4) Why defendant should not be held in contempt of court for failing to 
provide a complete accounting to the court and to the independent certified public 
accountant for the business known as Rying "N" Stables and all other business she has 
transacted in relation to the parties' horse ranch and related facilities. 
(5) Why defendant should not be held in contempt of court for the sale of 
the parties' horses in violation of the Order of the Court dated June 8, 1992 which 
permitted only the disposal of the horse business assets such as hay, etc. and further 
why defendant should not be held in contempt of court for failing to account for the 
sale of the parties' horses as required by Orders of the Court dated June 8, 1992 and 
January 10, 1994. 
-2-
(6) Why defendant should not be required to place all proceeds from the sale 
of all horses owned by the parties in trust pending final determination of this matter. 
(7) Why the business Flying "N" Stables together with the Payson ranch, barn 
and ranch house should not be sold due to the fact the horse business is losing money 
and causing a financial drain on the marital estate. 
(8) Why Plaintiff should not be granted access to the ranch house and 
property in order to remove his personal property from those premises. 
(9) Why the monthly rental from the ranch house, which amount is currently 
being received by defendant, should not be applied in its entirety to the mortgage on 
such ranch house, particularly now that Plaintiff is unemployed and will not be able to 
continue to make monthly payments. 
(10) Why defendant should not be held in contempt of court for secreting 
money and not providing an accounting of funds in the amount of $28,000 and in the 
amount of $9,000 from sales of horses and cattle in violation of the Order of the Court 
dated June 8, 1992 and the December 7, 1993 Order. 
(11) Why defendant should not be restrained from entering the Loafer Canyon 
Property unless in the presence of the realtor due to the fact that it appears defendant 
has removed materials left at the property which materials, such as Plaintiffs vacuum 
-3-
cleaner, ladder, etc, were left at the house to facilitate the final cleaning, painting and 
repair of the property for its sale. 
(12) Why another listing agent should not be appointed to handle the real 
properties which the parties are attempting to sell when the current listing contract 
expires in light of the fact that the present listing agent has had no success in the past 
nine months, 
(13) Why defendant should not be held in contempt of court for removing art 
from the Loafer Canyon house in violation of the Order of the Court dated June 8, 
1992. 
(14) Why defendant should not return the following personal items which 
defendant removed from the Loafer Canyon property: 
a. Art of family partnership, namely the Behren's "Parasol11. 
b. All Judy Larsen Art, which is owned by Watson-Kendall 
Investment Co. 
c* Plaintiffs wedding rings. 
d. Doug Ault lithographs, Andy Worhal, and Marilyn Monroe 
lithographies. 
e. Plaintiffs tennis racquet. 
f. Plaintiffs Compact Discs left in the home. 
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An electrical muscle stimulator belonging to Matt Carlson. 
Plaintiffs perfect swing trainer video. 
Plaintiffs black Trek mountain bike. 
Plaintiffs Minolta Camera and carrying case and two lenses. 
The Packard Bell 486 computer, printer, and keyboard which are 
owned by the corporation. 
Plaintiffs Mita copier. 
Tools which belonged to plaintiffs father and tools which were 
owned by plaintiff at the time of the marriage. 
Art of Pardell, Dolitte, Toulose Lautrac, Monet and Pizarro's 
"Street Vendor." 
5 personal grooming sets located in the Study of the parties' home. 
The second unassembled barbecue grill which was located in the 
metal building. 
Personal photograph albums belonging to Plaintiff and to his first 
wife, Hillary. 
Plates, utensils, pots and pans from recreational vehicle that sold 
and that were in boxes in the metal building. 
-5* 
(15) Why defendant should not be enjoined from making derogatory remarks 
regarding plaintiff and from discussing or making mention of the divorce or the parties' 
assets or finances with plaintiffs children or the parties' children. 
(16) Why defendant should not be obligated to pay for therapy expenses you 
unilaterally incurred for herself and the children in violation of the June 8, 1992 Order. 
(17) Why defendant should not be ordered to obtain plaintiffs consent prior 
to incurring expenses for which plaintiff will be obligated under prior court orders. 
(18) Why the Court's Order based upon this Order to Show Cause should not 
expressly modify and supersede previous court orders. 
DATED this < ^ day of June, 1994. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Daniel V. Goodsell 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2IZ- day of June, 1994, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE was mailed by United 
States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
C. Robert Collins 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 243 
405 East State Road 
American Fork, UT 84003 
AufcL Auu 
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Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. 924400816 
Judge Raymond M. Harding 
TO DEFENDANT AND HER ATTORNEY OF RECORD: 
You are hereby ordered to appear before the above-entitled Court at the Fourth 
Judicial District Courthouse, 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah, Room 201, on the 14th 
day of July, 1994 at the hour of 10:00 a.m., then and there to show cause, if any you 
may have, why the following relief should not be granted: 
(1) Why plaintiffs temporary alimony obligation should not be eliminated in 
light of the fact that plaintiff is unemployed and has thus far been unable to find even 
temporary employment. 
(2) Why unnecessary and unutilized assets of the marital estate should not be 
liquidated with the proceeds applied to paying off the enormous debt load of the 
marital estate. 
(3) Why plaintiff should not be solely authorized to sell said assets provided 
that all sale proceeds be placed in trust pending final resolution of this matter. 
(4) Why you should not be held in contempt of court for failing to provide a 
complete accounting to the court and to the independent certified public accountant for 
the business known as Flying ,fNff Stables and all other business you have transacted in 
relation to the parties' horse ranch and related facilities. 
(5) Why you should not be held in contempt of court for the sale of the 
parties' horses in violation of the Order of the Court dated June 8, 1992 which 
permitted only the disposal of the horse business assets such as hay, etc. and further 
why you should not be held in contempt of court for failing to account for the sale of 
the parties' horses as required by Orders of the Court dated June 8, 1992 and January 
10, 1994. 
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(<$) Why all proceeds from the sale of all horses owned by the parties should 
not be placed in trust pending final determination of this matter. 
(7) Why the business Flying "N" Stables together with the Payson ranch, barn 
and ranch house should not be sold due to the fact the horse business is losing money 
and causing a financial drain on the marital estate. 
(8) Why Plaintiff should not be granted access to the ranch house and 
property in order to remove his personal property from those premises. 
(9) Why the monthly rental from the ranch house, which amount is currently 
being received by you, should not be applied in its entirety to the mortgage on such 
ranch house, particularly now that Plaintiff is unemployed and will not be able to 
continue to make monthly payments. 
(10) Why you should not be held in contempt of court for secreting money 
and not providing an accounting of funds in the amount of $28,000 and in the amount 
of $9,000 from sales of horses and cattle in violation of the Order of the Court dated 
June 8, 1992 and the December 7, 1993 Order. 
(11) Why you should not be restrained from entering the Loafer Canyon 
Property unless in the presence of the realtor due to the fact that it appears you have 
removed equipment and materials left at the property which materials, such as 
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Plaintiffs vacuum cleaner, ladder, etc. were left at the house to facilitate the final 
cleaning, painting and repair of the property for its sale. 
(12) Why another listing agent should not be appointed to handle the real 
properties which the parties are attempting to sell when the current listing contract 
expires in light of the fact that the present listing agent has had no success in the past 
nine months. 
(13) Why you should not be held in contempt of court for removing art from 
the Loafer Canyon house in violation of the Order of the Court dated June 8, 1992. 
(14) Why you should not return the following personal items which you 
removed from the Loafer Canyon property: 
a. Art of family partnership, namely the Behren's "Parasol". 
b. All Judy Larsen Art, which is owned by Watson-Kendall 
Investment Co. 
c. Plaintiffs wedding rings. 
d. Doug Ault lithographs, Andy Worhal, and Marilyn Monroe 
lithographies. 
e. Plaintiffs tennis racquet. 
f. Plaintiffs Compact Discs left in the home. 
g. An electrical muscle stimulator belonging to Matt Carlson. 
.4. 
Plaintiffs perfect swing trainer video. 
Plaintiffs black Trek mountain bike. 
Plaintiffs Minolta Camera and carrying case and two lenses. 
The Packard Bell 486 computer, printer, and keyboard which are 
owned by the corporation. 
Plaintiffs Mita copier. 
Tools which belonged to plaintiffs father and tools which were 
owned by plaintiff at the time of the marriage. 
Art of Pardell, Dolitte, Toulose Lautrac, Monet and Pizarro's 
"Street Vendor." 
5 personal grooming sets located in the Study of the parties' home. 
The second unassembled barbecue grill which was located in the 
metal building. 
Personal photograph albums belonging to Plaintiff and to his first 
wife, Hillaiy. 
Plates, utensils, pots and pans from recreational vehicle that sold 
and that were in boxes in the metal building. 
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(15) Why you should not be enjoined from making derogatory remarks 
regarding plaintiff and from discussing or making mention of the divorce or the parties' 
assets or finances with plaintiffs children or the parties' children. 
(16) Why you should not be obligated to pay for therapy expenses you 
unilaterally incurred for yourself and the children in violation of the June 8, 1992 
Order. 
(17) Why you should not be ordered to obtain plaintiffs consent prior to 
incurring expenses for which plaintiff will be obligated under prior court orders. 
(18) Why the Court's Order based upon this Order to Show Cause should not 
expressly modify and supersede previous court orders. 
DATED this day of June, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
-6-
CERTIHCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2Z> day of June, 1994, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE was mailed by United States mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
C. Robert Collins 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 243 
405 East State Road 
American Fork, UT 84003 
J:\SlCr\5OM\WATJONV0SC4 
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Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID 
WARREN WATSON IN 
SUPPORT OF ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. 924400816 




STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
David W. Watson, being first duly sworn, hereby states as follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in this divorce action. 
2. This affidavit is submitted in support of plaintiffs order to show cause 
filed concurrently. 
3. I will not be able to return to work at Mountain View Hospital. It is 
clear that the hospital is concerned that all of the personal problems engendered by 
this divorce will interfere with my work. The hospital issued an invitation to the then 
current anesthesiologists to submit a bid contracting their services and the services of 
six Certified Registered Nurse Anesthesiologists ("CRNAs"). The CRNAs whom I have 
been working with declined to join me in a bid due to all of the problems and publicity 
that this extended divorce has caused. On the short notice given, it was impossible to 
contact CRNAs in other areas or states, get a commitment from them that they would 
be available and would agree to move to this area in time for me to present a bid to 
the hospital. 
4. I have now been unemployed for over three months. I have been actively 
searching for new employment, both temporary and permanent. I have looked for 
work in Utah, Idaho, Nevada and Colorado. I have also placed an ad in the Journal 
of American Society of Anesthesiologists. This is a particularly difficult time of the 
year to find employment as an anesthesiologist since those in training who will graduate 
this July have by this time taken all the available positions. While I still maintain hope 
that I can find employment, I am concerned that my chances of being employed are 
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limited by the fact that I will have to ask for an extended leave for trial in this matter 
if we cannot resolve some of these issues ahead of time. 
5. I have been depleting my accounts receivable in order to preserve as 
many of the marital assets as possible. Depletion of the reserve account will also make 
it more difficult for me to find employment because I will not have the funds to pay 
the CRNAs salaries until the amounts for services rendered are collected. However, I 
have no choice if I am to preserve as many marital assets as possible. Immediate 
resolution of the property matters would increase the possibility for finding gainful 
employment. 
6. Obviously, I am unable to service all of the debt load since I am 
unemployed. I have attempted to arrange the sale of some of the property such as the 
six-horse trailer. My attorney provided to defendant's attorney the name of the dealer 
interested in purchasing the trailer, the amount he was willing to pay and the telephone 
number where he could be reached. It is my understanding that defendant rejected the 
offer outright. The trailer is no longer needed for a horse business that is depleted of 
its horses. 
7. Working with the realtors I helped arrange the sale of the hayfield in 
Lakeshore. The sale price was discounted $4,000 because defendant stated she had 
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sold the hay for this year, I now believe that defendant kept the hay for her personal 
use. 
8. Flying N Stables has always lost money which fact was validated by Sid 
Gilbert, the independent CPA, in his report, therefore, all assets of Flying N should be 
sold immediately and all funds should be placed in trust. It is apparent that defendant 
has taken and/or disposed of assets such as horses and the corral structure without 
accounting for any of it. If the court does not order the immediate liquidation of 
Flying N and all assets associated with it, then I believe the court should appoint 
someone to manage the property who will provide an accounting of all funds. 
9. Just a few days ago, someone entered the home in Loafer Canyon and 
removed a vacuum cleaner, ladder, battery to my mobile phone and various other 
cleaning items from the home. Defendant is the only person, other than the realtors, 
who has the combination and I believe that she simply removed those items to make it 
more difficult for me to ready the home for sale. 
10. Defendant has been asked repeatedly to return the personal and 
corporate items taken from the home and she refuses to do so. My older childrens* 
birth certificates, my wedding rings, etc. can be of no possible interest to her; I think 
she simply does not want to make any effort to be reasonable. Defendant also 
continues to hold my father's tools and the tools I had accumulated over the years. 
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11. I have also been prohibited from retrieving my personal property from 
the Payson ranch house- I believe that removal of my personal property would make 
the properties more saleable. 
12. Because I am unemployed, I believe it is imperative that the rental 
income from the Payson ranch house be applied to the mortgage on that property. I 
am not able to service all of the debt and a continued delay may result in my having 
to file bankruptcy to prevent foreclosure on a marital asset. 
DATED this 23i_ day of June, 1994. 
DAVID W. WATSON 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^fX day of June, 1994. 
affidosc 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
T hereby certify that on this < S ^ day of June, 1994, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID WARREN WATSON IN SUPPORT OF 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE was mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
C Robert Collins 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 243 
405 East State Road 





IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Davis W. Watsonr 
Petitioner, 
v* 
The Honorable Ray M« Harding, 
District Court Judge, 
Respondent. 
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Marilyn M.Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 940467-CA 
Before Judges Davis, Billings, and Jackson (Law & Motion). 
This matter is before the court on petition for 
extraordinary writ pursuant to Rule 19, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied. 
Dated this *^> day of September, 1994. 
. Billings, «3w3ge dith M. Billings, 
d s > - ^ ^ ^ r ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ &*& 
Nonaan H. J^crJcson, Judge 
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Itt UK. 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Utah Bar #5455 
13444 North 32nd Street, #19 
P.O. Box 54516 
Phoenix, AZ. , 85078-4516 
(602) 788-7227 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 





BIFUCATED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924400816 
Judge Ray Harding 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the undersigned on 
the day written below, the parties appearing in person with their 
respective attorneys of record, the Court having reviewed the files 
and records herein, having made its FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW and deeming itself fully advised in the premises, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant is hereby granted 
a divorce from Plaintiff and the parties shall no longer be husband 
and wife. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall be restored to her 
former of NEBEKER. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues of this litigation 
shall be reserved for resolution at the time of trial. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decree should entered forthwith 
-f f\f**% 
and become final upon filing^with the Clerk of the Court, 
y/+* ^ ^ T ^ ^ ^ - ^ /99C Dated this 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the undersigned mailed, 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the forgoing on the 
of December, 1994, to: 
SAMUEL D. McVEY 
DANIEL V. GOODSELL 
Attorneys at Law 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT., 84111 
Jini L. Roby 
Office of the Guardian Ad Litem 
32 West Center, Suite 205 
Provo, Utah, 84601 
* # % 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Tab 6 
RLEO 
n f ^ K i u d i c , a l District Court 
CJUUJP' s,ate oi utah 
Deputy 
Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT, 
ALIMONY, DIVISION OF 
PROPERTY AND DIVISION OF 
DEBTS 
Civil No. 924400816 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
The issues of child support, alimony, division of property and division of debts in 
the above-referenced matter having come on regularly for hearing on April 11-12, 1995, 
the issues of child custody having been decided previously by a Juvenile Court Order 
dated November 10, 1994 and this Court having previously entered a Bifurcated Decree 
of Divorce on January 4, 1995, and the Court having heard testimony from the parties 
and their respective witnesses and having received into evidence numerous exhibits, and 
the Court having reviewed the pleadings, orders and other documents in the Court's 
file on this case, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Background 
1. The parties were bona fide and actual residents of Utah County, State of 
Utah, for a period in excess of three months prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. The parties were husband and wife having married on September 2, 1988 
in Utah County, State of Utah and having been divorced by a Bifurcated Decree of 
Divorce dated January 4, 1995. 
3. The Court finds that the parties resided together as husband and wife for 
three and one-half years until approximately April 15, 1992 when plaintiff commenced 
this action for divorce. 
4. The Court further finds that the parties remained separated until July of 
1992 at which time the parties attempted to reconcile. The parties attempts at 
reconciliation lasted until August 27, 1993 when the parties separated for the second 
and final time. 
Procedural History 
5. Based upon a review of the Court's file, the Court finds that on June 8, 
1992, Commissioner Howard Maetani issued a temporary order in this case providing, 
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among other things, that, (1) the parties were "enjoined and prohibited from taking any 
action to secrete, dissipate, encumber or take any action that may impair or decrease 
the value of the real or personal property of the parties during the pendency of this 
action," (2) defendant was awarded temporary use of the home at Loafer Canyon in 
Salem, Utah, (3) defendant was allowed to operate the business known as the Flying 
"N" Stables "subject to accounting for its profit or loss," (4) the art collection was to 
remain at the Loafer Canyon house, (5) the parties were to consult a therapist and 
counsel with their therapist and with the custody evaluator in jointly choosing a 
therapist for the children, (6) plaintiff was awarded temporary custody of the one child 
born of this marriage, McCade Watson ("McCade"), and of the two children from 
defendant's previous marriage, Lindsay Watson ("Lindsay") and Scott Watson ("Scott"), 
(7) based upon the finding that plaintiff had gross income at that time of $35,600.00 
per month, plaintiff was ordered to pay temporary child support in the sum of 
$3,900.00 per month, (8) plaintiff was ordered to pay defendant temporary alimony in 
the sum of $800.00 per month, (9) plaintiff was ordered to service the marital debts 
which were collectively found to require monthly payments of $15,866.29. 
6. Following the parties' second separation, the parties agreed that 
Commissioner Maetani's order dated June 8, 1992 would remain in full force and 
effect. 
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7. Based upon a review of the Court's file, the Court finds that the issue of 
child custody was transferred to the Juvenile Court by order of Judge Steven Hansen 
dated April 11, 1994 and that on November 10, 1994, Juvenile Court Judge Leslie D. 
Brown, based upon the stipulation of the parties, awarded the custody of McCade and 
Lindsay to defendant. Under this same stipulated order, Scott was placed in the 
custody of the State of Utah. 
Income of Plaintiff 
8. The Court finds that plaintiff is currently unemployed and that he is not 
generating any income. The Court does find, however, that plaintiff is actively engaged 
in attempting to rebuild a medical practice in the State of Nevada. Based upon the 
testimony of the parties and upon plaintiffs Exhibit No. 6 which is a detailed 
description of plaintiffs attempts to become employed, and following the analysis 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a), Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah App. 
1994) and Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the Court finds that plaintiff 
is not voluntary unemployed or underemployed. In particular, the Court finds that 
plaintiff lost his employment as an anesthesiologist at Mountain View Hospital in 
Payson, Utah, on or about April 1, 1994, when for reasons beyond plaintiff's control, 
the hospital asked plaintiff to take a temporary leave of absence while authorities 
investigated certain criminal allegations against plaintiff. The Court recognizes that an 
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anesthesiologist must not be suffering from any mental or emotional impairment due to 
the life or death consequences of the decisions he must make. Based upon plaintiffs 
undisputed testimony regarding the allegations made against him by defendant that 
plaintiff had (1) killed one of the parties' horses, (2) killed the parties' puppies, (3) 
possessed certain medications illegally, (4) filed fraudulent tax returns, (5) attempted to 
kill the defendant, and (6) physically and sexually abused the children, and based 
further on the understandable effect such allegations would have on plaintiff's 
emotional and mental state, the Court finds it was reasonable and prudent for plaintiff 
to consent to take a leave of absence from the hospital upon request while the 
authorities investigated the criminal allegations. The Court also finds that no criminal 
charges have been filed against plaintiff with respect to such allegations and therefore 
presumes that the authorities did not substantiate the criminal allegations. 
9. The Court further finds that during plaintiffs leave of absence, the 
hospital decided to enter into an exclusive contract with anesthesiologists other than 
plaintiff, which event was also beyond plaintiffs control. Specifically, the Court finds 
that plaintiff was precluded from attempting to negotiate his own exclusive contract 
with the hospital because it was impossible under the circumstances to locate and hire 
certified registered nurse anesthetists within the two week period of time allowed by 
the hospital. 
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10. Moreover, based upon the plaintiffs' testimony, the Court finds that 
plaintiffs historical income is not a fair and accurate indicator of plaintiffs current 
earning potential because it is extremely unlikely that plaintiff will be able to build up 
a practice again in which he can supervise a large number of certified registered nurse 
anesthetists as he was doing at Mountain View Hospital. The Court finds that it will 
take several years for plaintiff to rebuild his medical practice in a new community and, 
based on plaintiffs undisputed testimony, the Court finds that plaintiffs projected 
income will probably be less than one-half of his historical income while practicing at 
Mountain View Hospital. 
11. The Court is not persuaded by defendant's argument that plaintiff should 
immediately pursue employment in other areas of medical specialty. The Court finds 
that plaintiff completed a one year internship and a two year residency in 
anesthesiology after receiving his medical degree and that plaintiff also has seventeen 
years of experience as a practicing anesthesiologist. The Court finds that plaintiff has 
made diligent efforts to rebuild a practice in his area of specialty as an anesthesiologist 
and in fact, has acquired or is in the process of acquiring staff privileges at several 
hospitals in Reno, Nevada, and in Las Vegas, Nevada to practice medicine once again 
as an anesthesiologist. In addition, the Court finds that for plaintiff to pursue 
employment in another medical specialty, it would take one to three years of additional 
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training. Under the circumstances, the Court finds it would be unreasonable to expect 
plaintiff to abandon his area of specialty as an anesthesiologist and pursue another area 
of specialty. 
Income of Defendant 
12. Based upon defendant's admission that she is currently employed as a 
nurse practitioner with FHP of Utah, Inc. and based upon defendant's admission that 
she entered into a Professional Employment Agreement with FHP on July 15, 1994, 
which agreement was admitted into evidence as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 28, the Court 
finds that defendant earns a salary of $45,500.00 per year, or $3,792.00 per month. 
Child Support 
13. Based upon the Court's findings stated above with respect to the parties' 
respective incomes, the Court finds that plaintiff should not be ordered to pay child 
support at the present time. In this regard, the Court finds that defendant's income is 
sufficient to support the children in her custody on a temporary basis. However, the 
Court finds that as soon as plaintiff begins to generate an income from his medical 
practice, he should be required to report such income immediately to defendant and a 
modified Court Order should issue ordering plaintiff to pay child support consistent 
with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines based upon the parties' respective incomes 
at that time. 
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Findings Regarding Alimony 
14. Based upon the criteria established in Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 
841, 843 (Utah App. 1992) and Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Utah App. 1994), the 
Court makes the following specific findings with respect to alimony: 
a. Financial Conditions and Needs of the Parties. The Court finds that the 
greatest financial need of the parties is the payment of debt. It therefore will be the 
order of this Court, as set forth below, that all currently existing marital debts be 
extinguished by the sale of the parties marital real property and other liquid assets. 
The Court also finds in this same regard that the other drain on the disposable income 
of this marriage, besides marital debt service, was caused by the horse business, which 
business essentially has been liquidated. Therefore, the Court finds that the future 
financial needs of plaintiff primarily will consist of housing, food, clothing, malpractice 
insurance, medical insurance, utilities, automobile maintenance, entertainment and other 
incidentals. Specifically, based upon the statement of monthly expenses included in 
plaintiffs Financial Declaration filed with the Court, plaintiff reported the following 
monthly expenses exclusive of debt service and support obligations: 
Medical insurance $ 200.00 
Property taxes 200.00 
Vehicle operation and maintenance 
(gas, oil, lube and repairs) 400.00 
Electricity - Loafer Canyon Home 80.00 
Electricity - Payson Ranch house 150.00 
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Rent and food 1,000.00 
Other living expenses 750.00 
Malpractice insurance 1,000.00 
Disability insurance $ 900.00 
Total $4,680.00 
Likewise, the Court finds that defendant's future monthly expenses, exclusive of 
monthly debt service, will consist primarily of the mortgage payment, utilities payments, 
food, clothing and other incidental living expenses. Specifically, defendant reports the 
following monthly expenses in her Financial Declaration filed with the Court: 
Mortgage, real property tax 
and real property insurance 
Maintenance 
Food and household supplies 
Utilities 
Telephone 
Laundry and cleaning 
Clothes 
























b. Ability of parties to provide for themselves. Because of plaintiffs 
loss of employment, the Court finds that he is temporarily unable to provide for 
-9-
himself without selling off assets and applying the proceeds to paying his living 
expenses. The Court finds that defendant's employment provides her with the ability to 
provide for herself. The Court finds that neither party is currently capable of paying 
the monthly expenses reported in their respective Financial Declarations, but the Court 
further finds that the monthly expenses reported by the parties are unrealistic and 
unattainable in light of plaintiffs loss of employment. 
c. Ability of parties to provide support. The Court finds that neither 
the plaintiff nor the defendant is able to provide support to the other under the 
current circumstances. 
d. Other factors. Also with respect to the issue of alimony, the Court 
finds that this marriage was of short duration, that the parties are both well educated 
and capable of favorable employment, that the defendant was employed prior to the 
marriage and during the marriage as a nurse practitioner, was also employed full-time 
during this marriage in the horse business, and is currently employed as a nurse 
practitioner, and that plaintiffs earning potential has been seriously and permanently 
diminished, at least in part, because of defendant's numerous allegations of misconduct 
against plaintiff. The Court further finds that the parties have resided together as 
husband and wife for only about three years and that plaintiff has paid defendant 
alimony of over two years since the parties first separated in April of 1992. The Court 
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therefore finds that under all of the above circumstances, viewed cumulatively, it would 
be unfair and inequitable to award either party alimony. 
Separate Property 
15. General At the hearing, plaintiff admitted as plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 a 
detailed statement of assets listing both the real and personal property of the parties. 
In the left-hand column of plaintiff's statement of assets, plaintiff designated the 
property into the following five categories: 
M = marital property of the parties 
S/S = defendant's separate property currently in the possession of defendant 
S/D = plaintiff's separate property currently in the possession of plaintiff 
S/D* = plaintiff's separate property currently in the possession of defendant 
S/D** = plaintiffs separate property currently being held in impound by the 
Utah County Sheriffs Department 
16. In response to plaintiffs statement of assets, defendant admitted 
defendant's Exhibit No. 51 which is the same statement of assets admitted by plaintiff, 
only with defendant's handwritten notes on the statement. At the hearing, defendant 
indicated that she did not agree with plaintiffs designation of the property as either 
marital or separate property but defendant did not provide any testimony as to how 
she would designate the property differently. In addition, defendant failed to provide 
any testimony explaining her handwritten notes on her Exhibit 51, which notes are 
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virtually impossible for the Court to understand. The Court therefore adopts plaintiffs 
Exhibit 3 as a true and accurate statement of the parties assets and the Court 
furthermore adopts plaintiff's designation of the assets as either separate or marital 
property of the parties. 
17. Plaintiffs separate real property. 
a. The Court finds that the home in Loafer Canyon in Salem, Utah, 
plus the underlying ten acres were owned by plaintiff prior to this marriage and title to 
such property has remained in plaintiffs name only. The Court therefore finds the 
Loafer Canyon home plus the underlying ten acres is plaintiffs separate property. 
While there was testimony from the parties that a metal building was erected on the 
Loafer Canyon property during the marriage and that certain cosmetic improvements 
were made to the property during marriage, all such improvements were financed by 
borrowing against the Central Bank home equity line secured by the Loafer Canyon 
home, which debt, together with all other debt secured by the Loafer Canyon property, 
as set forth below, is found by the Court to be plaintiffs separate debt. As a result, 
the Court finds it is fair and equitable that the Loafer Canyon Home and underlying 
ten acres, together with all improvements thereon and all debts thereon, be deemed to 
be the separate property of plaintiff. 
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b. In addition, the Court finds that plaintiff owned a one-seventh 
interest in the St. George condominium prior to this marriage. While another one-
seventh interest in the St. George condominium was purchased by plaintiff during this 
marriage, the Court finds that the second one-seventh interest was purchased by 
plaintiff by borrowing against the Central Bank home equity line of credit secured by 
the Loafer Canyon home, which line of credit is deemed to be plaintiffs separate debt. 
Therefore, under the analysis prescribed by Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 
1982), the entire two-sevenths interest in the St. George condominium is found to be 
plaintiffs separate property. 
c. The Court also finds that plaintiff owned a condominium in Provo 
at the time the parties married, which condominium would also be plaintiffs separate 
property. However, the Provo condominium was sold during this marriage and the net 
proceeds from the sale in the amount of $19,000.00 were applied to purchase 32 acres 
of farm land in Lakeshore, Utah, which property has also been sold and the net 
proceeds are currently held in an escrow account with Provo Abstract Company. The 
Court finds that it is fair and equitable that plaintiff get credit for such $19,000.00 
separate property from the proceeds of the Lakeshore property. However, because the 
proceeds from the sale of the Lakeshore property are also partially marital property, 
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the division of such proceeds will be addressed below as part of the division of marital 
assets. 
18. Defendant's separate real property. Defendant brought a house from a 
prior marriage into this marriage. When presented with the settlement statement 
admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 52, Defendant admitted that her house from her 
prior marriage was sold on November 19, 1991 and that after paying closing costs and 
the mortgage balance, $32,470.26 cash was distributed to defendant, which money was 
deposited the next day into defendant's separate checking account with Far West Bank 
as evidenced by the Far West bank statement admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 53. 
Based upon the testimony of the parties and based on the settlement statement 
admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 29, the Court further finds that on July 8, 1994, 
defendant purchased a residence and underlying 5 acres in Lehi, Utah for $205,000.00. 
Defendant made a down payment on the purchase of such residence in the amount of 
$46,157.86. Although technically defendant's purchase of this residence was in violation 
of previous court orders against the sale or encumbrance of assets, and although the 
Court finds that defendant's purchase of this residence was not in the best interests of 
the marital estate inasmuch as the marital estate was already suffering from excessive 
debt and defendant had the Loafer Canyon home and the Payson Ranch house she 
could live in, thereby making the accumulation of additional debt unnecessary and 
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leaving other assets of the marital estate vacant and unutilized, the Court nevertheless 
finds that defendant's down payment for the purchase of this new residence came from 
the equity from defendant's Alpine home brought into the marriage. The Court 
therefore finds that the Lehi house is defendant's separate property inasmuch as the 
property is currently in her own name and the mortgage on the property is in 
defendant's name only as well. 
19. Plaintiffs separate personal property. Based upon the testimony of the 
parties and upon plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3 and based upon the criteria established in 
Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), the Court finds that the following 
property is plaintiffs separate property either owned prior to marriage or purchased 
from the proceeds of separate property owned by plaintiff prior to marriage: 
Accounts 
Central Bank - Checking (Acct. No. 09-0091307231) 
Piper Jaffray - Investment Account 
Mountain High Community Credit Union (Acct. No. 248-01) 
David W. Watson, M.D., P.C. Accounts 
Zions First National Bank (Provo Branch) -
Acct. No. 033-111600 
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Investments 
Navwest Investors Limited Partnership (1982) 
HIE Spanish Fork Utah partnership (Holiday Inn) 
David W. Watson - Piper Jaffray Investment Account 
Equipment 
Kubota L2850 Tractor 
Century sprayer (1987) 
Tiller (1982) 





1982 Chevy Luv Pickup 
Trailers 
Brown Trailer 
Red Trailer (12' x 5') 
Furniture 
Chest of drawers (master bedroom) 
Hampton piano 
Table with glass top (music room) 
Refrigerator - non-working 
Green Refrigerator (Ranch house) 
Brass bed (Lindsay's room) 
Jewelry chest 
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Mahogany kitchen collection 
6 chairs 
Table + 2 leaves 
Hutch 
Serving table 
Packard Bell 486DX Computer, Monitor, Keyboard, Printer and Software 
Mita Copier (1984) 
Computer workstation desk 
Table and chair set (in apartment above garage) 
Sansui Amplifier, Pioneer Tape Deck, CD Player, Tape Deck and Speakers 
(1979) 
Daybed 
Mirrored medicine cabinet (was attached to wall) 
9 drawer pine dresser 
RCA 21" television 
King size mattresses and box springs 
Brother AX33 electric typewriter (1986) 
Artwork 
Sumner painting - Whales (1983) 
Two (2) Charles Bragg lithographs (1983) 
4 Madam Alexander Dolls 
Jewelry 




Hand tools - hammers, pliers, wrenches, etc. 
2 red Craftsman Tool Chests & enclosed tools 
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Craftsman lawn mower (3 hp.) 
Tiller 
Miscellaneous Assets 
Victorian china collection (brown & gold pattern) 
Thimble collection 
Spoon collection 
Dr. Watson's pre-marital photograph album collection 
Compact disc collection 
Minolta 5000 Camera and lenses (wide angle and telephoto) 
Electrical Stimulator 
Swing trainer video 
Exercise set 




Garcia Mitchell 307 rod and reel 
Video collection (approximately 75) 
20. In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff offered undisputed testimony and 
admitted a schedule as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 38 detailing artwork belonging to the 
Watson-Kendall Investment Trust which is still in the possession of defendant. The 
Court finds that such artwork is in fact property of the Watson Kendall Investment 
Trust and should therefore be returned to plaintiff as trustee of such trust. The 
specific pieces of artwork belonging to the Watson Kendall Investment Trust are 
described as follows: 
Behren's painting - "Parasol" 
Larsen painting - "Eagles" 
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Larsen painting - "Werewolves" 
Larsen painting - "Coveting Coup" 
Auld lithograph - Jack Nicholson - Penguins 
Auld lithograph - Andy Warhol - Fish in a tank 
Auld lithograph - Marilyn Monroe - Fish in a tank 
21. Defendant's separate personal property. Based upon the testimony of the 
parties and the Court's findings set forth above regarding designation of separate 
property, the Court finds that the following property was defendant's separate property 
owned prior to this marriage: 
Accounts 
Bank of American Fork - Savings (Acct. No. 41-085-2) 




Horse Tack & Equipment 
English saddle 
15" Western Saddle 
Furniture 
Water bed 
Blue hide-a-bed couch 
2 Blue naugahyde chairs 
Chest of drawers (Travis' room) 
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Refrigerator 
IBM Computer & Printer 
Sharp Television 
GE Microwave 
Two (2) brass lamps 
Miscellaneous Assets 
Mrs. Watson's photo albums 
Marital Property 
22. Real property. The Court finds that the parties own, as marital property, 
the following real property: (1) 1.2 acres adjacent to the Loafer Canyon Home valued 
at approximately $10,000.00, (2) approximately 13 acres in Payson with a ranch house 
and barn valued at $360,000.00, and (3) a timeshare interest in a condominium in 
Maui, Hawaii valued at approximately $9,000.00. 
23. In addition, the Court finds that at the time of the parties' separation, 
they owned 32 acres of farm property in Lakeshore, Utah which was sold, the net 
proceeds of which were deposited with Provo Abstract Company, Inc. in escrow 
account no. 23596. The amount currently held in such escrow account is $63,736.72. 
24. The Court furthermore is informed by the parties' legal counsel that 
subsequent to the hearing in this matter, the parties 13 acres plus ranch house and 
barn in Payson has been sold for $360,000.00, the net proceeds of which are to be held 
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in escrow following closing by Courtesy Title Services pending a direction from this 
Court regarding distribution. In addition, the Court is informed by the parties' legal 
counsel that the parties' 1.2 acre tract adjacent to the Loafer Canyon Home has been 
sold, the proceeds of which are to be held by Security Title Company pending direction 
from this Court as to distribution. 
25. The Court finds that the sale of the 1.2 acres adjacent to the Loafer 
Canyon Home plus the sale of the property in Payson plus the money held in escrow 
by Provo Abstract Company will generate the following amount of cash available to the 
marital estate: 
1.2 acres adjacent to Loafer Canyon Home $ 10,000.00 
Payson ranch house, barn and 13+ acres 360,000.00 
Less 7% sales commission (25,900.00) 
Escrow - Provo Abstract Company, Inc. 63,736.72 
(Account No. 23596) 
Total $407,836.72 
26. As stated above, the Court finds that the parties are unable to service the 
marital debt any longer. Therefore, the Court finds that it is necessary that the 
proceeds from the sales of real property listed above be applied to the payment of 
marital debt. Specifically, the Court finds that it is fair and equitable that the money 
generated from the sales of the above-described property be applied to pay the 
following marital debts: 
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The Central Bank note (secured by the Payson barn) $ 94,000.00 
The Chase Manhattan Mortgage note (loan no. 593326-6) 
(secured by the Payson ranch house) 124,546.00 
The David W. Watson, M.D. P.C. pension plan note 
(secured by the Loafer Canyon home) 45,000.00 
Mountain High Community Credit Union (secured by the 
1993 Isuzu Rodeo) (Acct. No. 248-01) 15,000.00 
First Interstate Bank Master Card 
(Acct No. 5308-7000-0212-3266) 3,414.15 
First Interstate Bank Executive Line 
(Acct. No. 022-650-0035873-8001) 23,725.67 
Central Bank Visa Card (Acct. No. 4758-8001-6000-1338) 9,500.00 
MBNA America Credit Line (down payment on Payson barn) 
(Acct. No. 749-90015-546-123) 14,674.06 
MBNA America Credit Line (payment for horse tack & arena 
at Payson Ranch) (Acct. No. 4800-1205-1201-8524) 14,289.08 
MBNA America Credit Card (Acct. No. 5329-0315-2395-8130) 31,518.57 
MBNA America Credit Card (Acct. No. 5329-0318-6612-5675) 4,838.48 
Meridian School 10.000.00 
Total $390.506.01 
27. The Court further finds that it is fair and equitable that the above debts 
be paid directly out of the escrow accounts described above which hold the proceeds 
from the sale of the parties' real property. In addition, the Court notes the amounts of 
the debts listed above are the parties' best estimates as to amount and may not be 
entirely accurate due to recently accrued interest or recently made payments. 
Therefore, notwithstanding the amounts shown above, it is the Court's Order that the 
above debts be paid in their entirety. 
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28. In recognition of the fact that plaintiff applied $19,000.00 from the sale of 
his Provo condominium to the purchase of the Lakeshore property, the Court finds that 
any funds remaining in escrow after payment of the above debts and any administrative 
fees assessed by the companies handling such funds, up to $19,000.00, should be paid 
to plaintiff. Any such funds in excess of $19,000.00 should be divided equally between 
the parties. 
29. Personal property. The Court finds that the following is the marital 
property of the parties excluding real estate, plaintiffs pension and trust or escrow 
accounts: 
Insurance Policies Which Have a Cash Value 
Union Central Policy on Suzanne - cash value 
Union Central Policy on McCade - cash value 
Union Central Policy on Travis - cash value 
Equipment 
DR field mower 
Rock rake 
Flat-bed trailer 
Over 150 feet of galvanized corral panels 
Over 1,000' of metal arena panels plus 2 animal shoots & gates 
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Vehicles 
1993 Pontiac Grand-Am 
1990 One-Ton Chevy Pickup 
1993 Isuzu Rodeo 
1972 Ford Pickup 
Trailers 
Silver 2-horse Trailer 
Horses 
Rainbow's San Peppy 
Willie Expensive 
Horse Tack & Equipment 
Gary Warner saddle 
Child's english saddle 
15" Western Saddle 
15 hoods & 15 blankets 
5 saddle blankets 
15 lead ropes 
15 halters 
5 Bits 
7 silver inlaid (7 large - 2 yearling) 
"World" belt buckle 
2 belt buckles won in Elko in 1991 
Las Vegas belt buckle 
5 belt buckles awarded at AQHA Banquet 
25 trophies 
Show boots, clothes and hats 
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Furniture 
Lodge pole bed for children 
Cabinet with glass doors (master bedroom) 
Two (2) maroon naugahyde chairs and ottoman 
Bed (Scott's room) 
Nursery crib 
Nursery cradle 




Double bed and frame 
King size bed & headboard (Loafer Canyon) 
White couch, love seat, tapestry chair, end tables, 
center table with western pattern couch, love seat 
Washing Machine (Loafer Canyon) 
Dryer (Loafer Canyon) 
Freezer (Loafer Canyon) 
Western pole-framed love seat, couch, 1 chair 
Western pole-framed end tables 
45" Big Screen T.V. (Loafer Canyon) 
Fruit dehydrator 
Canoe 
2 children's bicycles 
2 mountain bikes 
2 16' aluminum extension ladders 
Child's wagon (Burley) to attach to bicycle 
Skis, ski poles, boots, ski outfits 
Ski outfit 
Artwork 
Friedman lithograph - Indian Warrior (Gift to Dr. Watson) 
Rodriguez lithograph - Mountain Man #1 
Rodriguez lithograph - Mountain Man #2 
Pardell Sculptures 
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Johnson's Last Flight (artist's proof) 
(2-3) Defiant Commance (artist's proof) 
Unexpected Warrior/Rescuer (artist's proof) 
(2) No More Forever (artist's proof) 
3rd Defiant Commance (artist's proof) 
(2) First Coup (numbered piece) 
Sacajwea (numbered piece) 
Crow Warrior (numbered piece) 
Tables Turned (numbered piece) 
Latest Medicine Man (numbered piece) 
No More Forever (numbered piece) 
Rustin a Heard Quitter (numbered piece) 
Douglas Lee Painting - Indian Mother with baby on back 
Douglas Lee Paintings 
Barn 
Stick people #1 





Pizarro lithograph - Market Scene 
Bev Doolittle lithograph - Coyote & Rainbow (framed) 
Bev Doolittle lithograph - Coyote & Rainbow (unframed) 
Jewelry 
9mm wedding band with 1 caret marquis diamond, 2 sapphires, 
2 emeralds and 2 diamonds 
6mm wedding band with 2 diamonds, 1 emerald, 1 sapphire 
White gold bracelet with "Suzi" in diamond chips 
Gold bracelet with dolphin's head (1991 Hawaii) 
Gold bracelet with whale fluke (1992 Hawaii) 
Gold circular Chinese pendant with gemstones 
Sapphire and diamond earrings, necklace and matching pendant 
Half-caret diamond earrings 
Round gold earrings to match wedding ring with emeralds, etc. 
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Emerald and diamond gold earrings 
18" heavy gold rope chain 
Men's wedding band with two (2) diamonds, one (1) sapphire 
and one (1) emerald 
Gold ring with star sapphire (Lake Tahoe 1988) 
Amethyst and diamond necklace with matching earrings 
2 Gold filigree gold rings 
Sterling silver elk head with emerald eye 
7mm 20" gold herringbone necklace 
Hawaiian heirloom ring (1991 Hawaii) 
Hawaiian heirloom bracelet (1991 Hawaii) 
Other gold and silver earrings, necklaces and rings, etc. 
7 mm men's wedding band with two (2) diamonds, 
one (1) sapphire and one (1) emerald 




Mitre - crosscut saw 
Makita drill set with charger and batteries 
Dremel sanding set + 40 attachments 
Journeyman victor acetylene welding set 
Diesel heater (bullet type) 
Miscellaneous Assets 
Anderson knife 
12 gauge Browning shotgun 
Bolt-action 22 gauge rifle 
Barbecue (unassembled) + 5 gallon propane tank 
Barbecue + two 5 gallon tanks 
3 tennis racquets (Mrs. Watson) 
Boston Trader sweater with nautical design 




4 children's backpacks 
6 sleeping bags (below 0°) 
4-man tent 
Fishing tackle box with tackle 
5 rods and reels 
Dr. Watson's clothing and personal affects 
• aqua green AQHA jacket 
- red Mr. MBJ Opie jacket 
Post marriage photo albums and videos 
Video collection (approximately 175) 
Sony video camera 
Sears lifestyler treadmill 
Christmas china collection 
Christmas decoration collection 
Portable compact disc player 
Ski training machine 
Watch dog - Blue 
Australian shepherd - male 
Australian shepherd - female 
2 Rotweilers 
It is fair and equitable that the property designated above be equally divided between 
the parties. The parties should agree upon this division within 30 days of entry of 
these Findings. Should the parties be unable to agree on an equitable division, plaintiff 
should make two (2) lists for division of the personal property not specifically set forth 
herein. Defendant should be allowed to select either of the two (2) lists prepared by 
plaintiff as in her sole discretion she desires and the property on that list shall be 
awarded to her and the property on the other list awarded to plaintiff. Should 
defendant decline to select either list prepared by plaintiff within 30 days of entry of 
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these Findings, then all personal property should be sold by a court appointed master 
and the proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties. The parties should be 
permitted to bid on any item sold. The cost of the services of the master should be 
paid from the proceeds of sale before distribution to the parties. 
30. The Court further finds that in addition to the above-described marital 
property, the parties own a timeshare in Maui, Hawaii. The Court reserves the Maui 
timeshare for balancing the equities of the parties as set forth below under the heading 
"Equitable Offsets." 
Division of Debts 
31. Plaintiffs separate debts. As stated above, the Court finds that the 
Loafer Canyon Home and underlying 10 acres is separate property of the plaintiff. 
The Court further finds that the mortgage loan from Crossland Mortgage Corporation 
in the amount of $150,945.47 (Loan No. 2205169) secured by the Loafer Canyon Home 
was plaintiffs separate debt from prior to this marriage. The Court also finds that the 
$20,000.00 note to Kirton & McConkie secured by the Loafer Canyon Home is 
plaintiffs separate debt incurred by the plaintiff after the parties' separation. In 
addition, the Court finds that the home equity line loan at Central Bank (Account 
No. 09-0097950166) in the amount of $111,801.13 also secured by the Loafer Canyon 
Home was incurred to purchase plaintiffs partnership interest in HIE Spanish Fork 
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Utah Partnership (Holiday Inn) set forth above as plaintiffs separate property, together 
with plaintiffs interests in the St, George timeshare and also to construct the metal 
building on the Loafer Canyon property and to make the cosmetic improvements to 
the Loafer Canyon property. Because all of the above items have been awarded to 
plaintiff as plaintiffs separate property in accordance with the Preston decision, the 
Court finds that the Central Bank home equity line is also a separate debt of the 
plaintiff. 
32. In addition, based upon the testimony of the parties and the Statement 
of Assets admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3, the Court finds that the following debts 
are also plaintiffs separate debt: 
Zions Visa Bank Card $3,500.00 
Central Bank - Speakeasy account $9,500.00 
33. Defendant's separate debts. Based upon the Court's finding above that 
the residence purchase by defendant in Lehi, Utah and the underlying five acres shall 
be deemed defendant's separate property, the Court also finds that the mortgage loan 
on defendant's home with North American Mortgage Company in the amount of 
$164,000.00, which loan was unilaterally incurred by defendant after the parties' 
separation, also shall be deemed defendant's separate debt. In addition, the Court 
finds the following are also defendant's separate debts which were incurred by 
defendant after the parties' final separation: 
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Nordstrom $1,000.00 
Central Bank VISA 1,500.00 
Discover 1,500.00 
RC Willey 1,500.00 
Victoria Secret 200.00 
Cellular One 200.00 
ZCMI 500.00 
34. The Courts finds that Gail Stringham, Ph.D. asserts a claim relating to 
psychiatric counselling provided to defendant and the minor children in defendant's 
care and custody. The Court further finds that such psychiatric care was provided 
without plaintiffs consent and without consulting the custody evaluator as ordered by 
Commissioner Maetani in his June 6, 1992 temporary order. It would clearly be unfair 
and inequitable to require plaintiff to pay the debt to Dr. Stringham when plaintiff was 
precluded from any participation in the therapy services provided and when defendant 
unilaterally requested and authorized such services and without consulting with the 
Court, with plaintiff or with the custody evaluator. The Court therefore finds that it is 
proper, fair and equitable that defendant assume and hold plaintiff harmless from the 
debt to Dr. Stringham. 
Child Support Arrearage 
35. On the issue of child support arrearages, the Court has reviewed the 
order of Juvenile Court Judge Leslie D. Brown dated May 20, 1994 authorizing child 
support payments to be paid out of the $30,000.00 held in the trust account of 
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defendant's legal counsel. Based upon the undisputed testimony of plaintiff that child 
support payments were made by plaintiff up through April 5, 1994, when plaintiff 
become unemployed, and based upon defendant's testimony that the full $30,000.00 
held in her attorney's trust was distributed to her to pay child support from April 5, 
1994 forward, the Court finds that it is fair and reasonable that plaintiff receive credit 
for the following child support payments paid out of such trust account: 
April 20, 1994 $1,300.00 
May 5, 1994 1,300.00 
May 20, 1994 1,300.00 
June 5, 1994 1,300.00 
June 20, 1994 1,300.00 
July 5, 1994 1,300.00 
July 20, 1994 1,300.00 
August 5, 1994 1,300.00 
August 20, 1994 1,300.00 
September 5, 1994 1,300.00 
September 20, 1994 1,300.00 
October 5, 1994 1,300.00 
October 20, 1994 1,300.00 
November 5, 1994 1,300.00 
November 20, 1994 1,300.00 
December 5, 1994 1,300.00 
December 20, 1994 1,300.00 
January 5, 1995 1,300.00 
January 20, 1995 1,300.00 
February 5, 1995 1,300.00 
February 20, 1995 1,300.00 
March 5, 1995 1,300.00 
March 20, 1995 1,300.00 
April 5, 1995 100.00 
Total $30.000.00 
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36. The Court also finds, however, that such support payments were made to 
defendant after plaintiff had become involuntarily unemployed. In addition, the Court 
finds that the above support payments after August 1, 1994 were excessive in light of 
defendant's unemployment as of that date with FHP. Therefore, the Court finds that it 
is fair and reasonable that plaintiff receive an equitable credit in the amount of 
$15,000.00 for child support overpaid. This equitable credit shall be handled as set 
forth below under the heading "Equitable Offsets." 
Rents from Payson Property 
37. The Court finds that defendant received $12,000.00 in rent from the 
Payson property, which property is a marital asset. It is fair and equitable that plaintiff 
receive an equitable credit for one-half of such rents, which equitable credit will be 
balanced with other equitable credits below under the heading "Equitable Offsets." 
Retirement Accounts 
38. Separate Accounts. The Court finds that prior to the parties' marriage, 
the parties each had individual retirement accounts which were not contributed to 
during this marriage and which therefore are the parties' separate property. It is 
therefore fair and reasonable that the parties each be awarded their own individual 
retirement accounts. 
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39. Plaintiffs Pension. 
a. The Court finds that plaintiff has a pension plan with his 
professional corporation, which pension plan was in existence prior to this marriage, 
but to which he made contributions during this marriage. Based on the testimony of 
the parties and on the accounting for plaintiffs pension plan submitted as plaintiffs 
Exhibit No. 2, the Court finds that as of the date of the parties* marriage, plaintiffs 
pension plan had a present value of $263,182.82. Following the requisite analysis set 
forth in Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602-03 (Utah App. 1994), the Court 
finds that it is fair and equitable that plaintiff be awarded the present value of his 
retirement plan as of the date of the parties' marriage plus any appreciation accruing 
during the marriage on such value accumulated in the profit sharing plan prior to the 
parties' marriage. 
b. The Court also finds that during the parties' marriage, plaintiff 
made annual contributions to the pension plan in the following amounts: 
Calendar year 1989 $13,552.42 
Calendar year 1990 43,518.80 
Calendar year 1991 23,702.27 
Calendar year 1992 23,082.68 
Calendar year 1993 7,050.00 
Calendar year 1994 0.00 
c. Based upon the analysis required by Chambers v. Chambers, 840 
P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1982), the Court finds that the preferred method for treating 
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retirement plans in divorce proceedings is to fix the spouse's respective shares in the 
pension plan and then satisfy the non-employee spouse's share out of other assets of 
the marital estate, thereby leaving all pension benefits to the employee spouse. To 
determine the defendant's share in plaintiffs pension, the Court finds that it is fair and 
equitable that defendant be given credit for one-half of the contributions made to the 
pension, together with one-half of all appreciation accrued on such contributions. In 
this particular case, the Court finds that it would be virtually impossible to exactly trace 
the contributions into the pension and thereafter calculate the appreciation on such 
contributions. Therefore, the Court finds it is fair and equitable to simply prorate the 
appreciation accrued in the pension equally between the accumulated value prior to 
marriage and the contributions made during marriage. In this regard, the Court makes 
the following calculation to fix the portion of plaintiffs pension that would be plaintiffs 
separate property as opposed to the portion of plaintiffs pension that would be marital 
property. 
MARITAL SEPARATE COMBINED 
Valuation as of 12/31/88 263,182.86 263,182.86 
1989 - Contributions less Expenses 12,875.00 12,875.00 
1989- Appreciation 36,189.91 36,189.91 
Valuation as of 12/31/89 12,875.00 299372.77 31X247.77 
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1990 - Contributions less Expenses 
(43,518.80 - 3,614.53) 
1990 - Marital Appreciation 
(11,096.46 x (12,875.00/312,247.77)) 
1990 - Separate Appreciation 
(11,096.46 x (299,372.77/312,247.77)) 
Valuation as of 12/31/90 
1991 - Contributions less Expenses 
(23,702.27 - 2,706.22) 
1991 - Marital Appreciation 
(51,199.93 x (53,236.81/363,248.50)) 
1991 - Separate Appreciation 
(51,199.93 x (310,011.69/363,248.50)) 
Valuation as of 12/31/91 
1992 - Contributions less Expenses 
(23,082.68 - 1,319.88) 
1992 - Marital Loss 
(-7,630.90 x (81,736.60/435,444.43)) 
1992 - Separate Loss 
(-7,630.90 x (353,707.83/435,444.43)) 
Valuation as of 12/31/92 
1993 - Contributions less Expenses 
(7,050.00 - 6,850.09) 
1993 - Marital Appreciation 
(4,999.83 x (102,067.02/449,576.33)) 
1993 - Separate Appreciation 
(4,999.83 x (347,509.31/449,576.33)) 




































1994 - Expenses (7,307.11) (7,307.11) 
1994 - Marital Loss 
(.39,447.65 x (103,402.04/454,776.07)) (8,969.18) 
1994 - Separate Loss 
(-39,447.65 x (351,374.03/454,776.07)) (30.478.47^ (30.478.47^ 
Valuation as of 12/31/94 $87,125.75 $320,895.56 $40&021.31 
40. With respect to the $87,125.75 which is determined by the above 
calculation to be the marital portion of plaintiffs pension, the Court finds that it fair 
and equitable that defendant receive an equitable credit for one-half of such value in 
the amount $43,562.88. The treatment of this equitable credit is set forth below under 
the heading "equitable offsets." 
Plaintiffs Accounts Receivable 
41. The Court finds that plaintiffs medical practice generates accounts 
receivable for professional services rendered. Based upon the testimony of the parties 
and the accounts receivable summaries admitted into evidence plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1, 
the Court finds that as of the date of the parties' marriage, plaintiff had accounts 
receivable from his medical practice in the amount of $242,044.81. The Court finds 
that it is fair and reasonable that the accounts receivable that plaintiff brought into the 
marriage be deemed plaintiffs separate property. The Court further finds that such 
accounts receivable remained relatively constant in amount over the term of this 
marriage until plaintiff lost his employment and was forced to draw upon his accounts 
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receivable to pay the marital debt of the parties. Moreover, the Court finds that as of 
the date of plaintiffs loss of employment on April 1, 1994, plaintiff had accounts 
receivable of $249,409.97. Based upon the testimony of the parties and the schedule of 
monthly debts service payments admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4, the Court finds 
that following Dr. Watson's loss of employment. Dr. Watson paid approximately 
$9,000.00 per month towards payment of marital debt, or a total of $117,000.00 
($9,000.00 x 13 months) up to the date of these Findings. In other words, Dr. Watson 
depleted his separate accounts receivable in the amount of $117,000.00 to pay marital 
debt from April 1, 1994 to date. The Court finds that because such debt service 
benefitted both parties and because it came from plaintiffs separate property and not 
his income, it is fair and equitable that plaintiff be given an equitable credit of one-
half of such payments in the amount of $58,500.00. 
42. Also based upon the parties' testimony and the accounts receivable 
summaries admitted into evidence as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1, the Court finds that as of 
the date of the hearing in this matter, plaintiffs accounts receivable had been reduced 
to approximately $11,005.08. The Court finds that besides paying marital debt, plaintiff 
was forced to reduce his accounts receivable to this level in order to provide for his 
own living expenses and to pay travel expenses associated with plaintiffs search for 
employment through the western states. The Court finds that because of the amount 
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of accounts receivable that plaintiff brought into the marriage as separate property, the 
ending balance of plaintiff's accounts receivable should be awarded to plaintiff. 
Funds Held in Attorneys, Trust 
43. Based upon the testimony of the parties and upon plaintiffs Exhibit 
No. 3, the Court finds that there is $20,234.00 in a trust account with plaintiffs legal 
counsel. The Court reserves treatment of this trust account for the section of these 
Findings under the heading "Equitable Offsets." 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
44. The Court finds that the division of the marital estate will put the parties 
in equal position to pay their own costs and attorneys' fees incurred in this divorce 
proceeding. The Court therefore finds that it is fair and equitable that each party be 
ordered to pay their own costs and attorneys' fees incurred in this action. 
Medical and Dental Needs of the Children 
45. The Court finds that defendant has medical and dental insurance 
available to her through her employer and therefore finds that it is fair and equitable 
that defendant should be ordered to maintain such medical and dental insurance on 
McCade and Lindsay. The parties will contribute equally to all uninsured medical and 
dental expenses of McCade and Lindsay. 
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Tax Exemptions 
46. It is fair and equitable that defendant, as the custodian parent, be entitled 
to claim McCade and Lindsay as exemptions for income tax purposes; provided, 
however, that plaintiff shall be entitled to purchase the tax exemptions for Lindsay and 
McCade from defendant so long as plaintiff is paying child support for McCade and 
Lindsay and so long as plaintiff pays to defendant the value, in terms of tax savings, 
that defendant would derive from claiming McCade and Lindsay as exemptions on her 
returns. 
Proceeds from Sale of Horses 
47. Based upon the testimony of the parties and plaintiffs Exhibit No. 30 and 
defendant's Exhibit No. 47, the Court finds that defendant sold several of the horses 
acquired during this marriage for $68,725.00 and that defendant deposited such 
proceeds into her own separate bank accounts. Based upon the testimony of the 
parties and representations by legal counsel and based upon Sid Gilbert's audit report 
admitted as plaintiffs Exhibit No. 34, the Court finds that defendant has failed to 
adequately account for expenses relating to the care and maintenance of the parties' 
horses. The Court has carefully examined defendant's Exhibit No. 48 which purports to 
be an accounting of certain horse expenses and the Court finds that such accounting is 
insufficient and lacking in documentation sufficient to allow plaintiff to verify such 
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expenses. In addition, it was undisputed at the hearing that the accounting summary 
admitted as defendant's Exhibit No 48 was provided to plaintiff foi the first time at 
trial and not oiliiini .r. IIMII lull I 1 i iiiliu m 111 in in I Hinders and as reque steel on 1:11 1m 2 i • ::: i is 
occasions by plaintiffs legal counsel. The Court therefore finds it is fair and equitable 
that defendant be solely responsible and receive no equitat le credit for whatever 
expenses, if any, were incurred on behalf of maintaining the horse*.
 A herefore, the 
Court finds that defendant received a financial benefit fron '' :\ r 1 rises in the 
amoi ii >f $<>tV72Ji IW mil I i \A if 
such proceeds in the amount of $34,362.50. The treatment of this equitable credit also 
shall be discussed below under the heading "Equitable Offsets." 
Allegations ot Contempt 
' \t the hearing, both parties submitted evidence regarding the other 
a l iege(j violations < , nns court orders in Ihis IMSC. In particular lh< (Viuil 
finds that defendant made the following allegations against plaintiff: 
a First, defendant alleges that plaintiff was in contempt of the 
issue, the Court finds that plaintiff entered the Payson Ranch property after defendant 
had moved to Lehi ami had Liken the horses and her possessions with her, In v: 
addition, the Payson Ranch property was in u ! • * - ..* mn 
because of the electricity and heat being turned off. The Court also finds that plaintiff 
caused no damage to the property. In fact, based on the testimony offered by Loran 
Bingham, plaintiff removed garbage, and dead trees from the property and otherwise 
cleaned the property to prepare it for sale. 
b. In addition, defendant elicited testimony from plaintiff that he had 
sold assets in his pension plan in technical violation of the Court order against the sale 
of any assets. In this regard, the Court finds that plaintiffs selling of assets in his 
pension fund were arms' length transactions and that the pension plan received full 
value for assets sold. Furthermore, the Court finds the proceeds from the sale of all 
assets were kept in the pension. There was therefore no damage to defendant or to 
the marital estate. 
c. Defendant further alleges that plaintiff violated an earlier order of 
this Court when he directed his real estate agent to put a lock box on the Loafer 
Canyon home. The Court finds that the Court had previously allowed plaintiff into the 
Loafer Canyon home to prepare it for sale and that defendant had previously moved 
from the Loafer Canyon home taking all the personal property with her except for one 
bed and some cleaning supplies. The Court also finds that plaintiff instructed his real 
estate agent to put a lock box on the Loafer Canyon home after certain property had 
been removed from the Loafer Canyon home. The purpose of the lock box was 
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merely to make a record of who had entered the property. In addition, the Court 
finds that the installation of the lock box did not preclude plaintiff from entering the ; 
combination and could let defendant into the house. 
A
 Defendant further elicited testimony that plaintiff had allowed 
friemk In 
Payson ranch. Plaintiff denied allowing friends to take equipment off of the Payson 
r a n c l 1 p r 0p e r t^ |; } ;|t ^ e a(jmitted that he sold hay that was old and creating a fire 
hazard on the property, plaintiff also testified that thr salt nil fiir 11;i', was In prnn.iir 
the $1,000.00 income from the farm, business necessary to qualify for the agricultural 
i 1 1 1 mii II i mi III! in mi11 in i i 1 1 s 1 1 1 1 in(' ii' s , t l i s Coi II I: finds that plaintiff "s sale of the hay 
did not cause any harm t :> the marital estate. The Coui t also finds that defendant did 
not direct friends to take equipment off of the Payson, ranch. 
e I LI I I I nit i n i l l i mi mi iiiil'iii nlU'il irviniii iur I il p l i m l i l l sold <i ti uli m 
which he lived in violation of the earlier court order against the sale of any assets. 
I " ! "* "1 '"ii M (mil ' 111 i il II II HI mi |»( i in i i i i l t pp lu ' i l i h i1 proceed'- l i o m tin1 sale o l the 
trailer to the payment of marital debt and that once plaintiff lost his employment and 
moved to Reno, it would have been unreasonable to expect him to maintain the trailer 
v;)Ca")< l i p t h n t i f Jinn, ' I'IHIII t\\\t i»-e. 
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49, At the hearing, plaintiff likewise elicited testimony regarding the following 
alleged violations of Court orders: 
a. First, defendant admitted that she had sold furniture in violation of 
the court orders. 
b. Defendant also admitted she had purchased her residence in Lehi 
in violation of court orders against the encumbrance of assets. 
c. In addition, the Court finds that defendant did not adequately 
account for the proceeds from sales of horses or for expenses incurred in the 
maintenance of the horses. 
d. Defendant also admitted that she had sold a 6-horse trailer and 
that she had changed the title of the parties' 1990 Chevy One-ton Pickup into her own 
name, all in violation of the previous Court order against selling, secreting, 
encumbering or otherwise transferring assets. 
e. Moreover, defendant admitted at the hearing that she had removed 
fencing from the Payson ranch which fencing was secured into the ground by cemented 
posts, which conduct was also technically in violation of previous court orders against 
damaging marital assets. 
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fc Defendant also removed artwork from the Loafer Canyon hame 
when she moved, which was also in violation of Commissioner Maetani 's temporary 
C 
g. Finally, defendant admitted that she did not disclose her 
employment with F H J I plaintiff and that defendant continued to draw several months 
of child support based nnni -•*. • -is IIIUIIIM1 levels, Resides llii" I in I lllliir11 u ea t cd jin 
unfair windfall i,? a Scndar ; >;> a,t further damaged plaintiff and the marital estate 
inasjiiiH ill .iii11. | ml .ill i if ill continued to pay the mommy private medical insurance premium 
iri the amount of $600.00 per month for the defendant and the children after ttin - kid 
become insured by defendant through her employer. 
i l l I III 1 1 1 VI t i l l * I I I H I l i l L S t J i i K T S I I I ! I I I IIIIIII II II II II I IK llllllllll.llll IIIIIII II 11 Il  IIIIIII l l l l ' I I K ' S I 
interests of justice or of the marital estate to make a finding of contempt and. impose 
penalties on the respective parties a •-:.-> time In this regai d, the Court finds that 
although technical violations of 
violations have been relatively minor without substantia! . , :! r na; «iai est a it In 
addit ling penalty is not \\\ d , p 
best interests of justice or resolving the differences of this marriage. Nevertheless, the 
l >urt admonishes the parties that although no finding of contempt will be issued at 
tins pru in mi I  IIIIIII I I mi mi in I lln I i lull I  in fin i I ii'i i r sHvrs tlir in ii'llil 1 nnsidei lllliin .ibuvr allegations 
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of contempt should there be any violations of the final Order of this Court. The Court 
hereby states for the benefit of the parties that any further violations of the Orders of 
the Court shall be penalized severely in light of the previous violations. 
Equitable Offsets 
51. As found above, the parties are entitled to the following equitable credits: 
Credits to Plaintiff 
One-half child support overpaid 15,000.00 
One-half of plaintiffs separate accounts receivable 
depleted to pay marital debt 58,500.00 
One-half of proceeds from sale of horses received by defendant 34,362.50 
One-half of rental income received by defendant $ 6,000.00 
Total $113,862.50 
Credits to Defendant 
One-half of marital portion of plaintiffs pension $ 43,562.88 
Total $ 43,562.88 
Difference in defendant's favor $ 70,299.62 
52. To somewhat balance the inequity of the above entitlements to equitable 
credits in defendant's favor, the Court hereby finds that it is fair and equitable that 
plaintiff be awarded the parties' timeshare in the Maui, Hawaii condominium, which 
timeshare interest is valued by the parties at $9,000.00, and that plaintiff also should be 
awarded the $20,234.00 held in his attorneys' trust account. 
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From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court hereby enters the following 
conclusions of la » : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Neither party should be awarded alimony. 
"I 111 I l l " ) !'» 1 ,','11 I I t i l l 11 11 " I l l V e . 
A'he parties5 real and personal property should be divided as set for th 
above. 
Fhe debts and obligations of the parties should be satisfied and divided as 
s 21: ft M th above. 
u. Defendant aiiould be ordered tc 
and dental insurance for th< Kneht *;i :u ninor children as v-; w ab,\t 
7 Tin1 iitMJik j | i in mi in I iJc11 in I ii I expenses ul I In • miiiui children tvlik.h are not 
covered by insurance should be divided as set forth above. 
l H D t h i s _ _ _ _ (uy ()f ioo<; 
ir ' i]'ii; n 
I lonorable Ray M. Harding 
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FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civi. 
..Judge Kay M, ll.udj.ng 
THIS MATTER h a v i n g come on r e g u l a r l y f o r t r i a l on A p r i l ] ] and 
12, 1995, b e f o r e t h e Honorab le .Judge Nay M. Hardin i ] , in i endant 
appear ' i nq wi t h IHM .it t i > i i M > >; l rnilKh"| cniMM1 I'Li'int if t appear i im 
waLh h i s a t t o r n e y , DANIEL GOODSEL1,, t he i m u t h a v i n g t a k e n 
e v i d e n c e , h a v i n g h e a r d from c o u n s e l , hav ing i eviewed t h e e x h i b i t s 
adm I t I < 11 (iinl lint-Mii i in i i I HI1V I MM I, nil l.ow.inq: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I . JURISDICTION & VENUE: Plaintiff has been a bona fide 
residnnl le State of Utah and Utah County for more than three 
(3) months prior to the filing of this action. Venue is proper in 
the above entitled Court. 
2. MARRIAGE: The parties were married on September 2, 1988 
and divorced by bifurcated decree on January 4, 1995. 
3. CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION: The issues of custody and 
visitation of the parties' minor child McCADE WATSON and 
Plaintiff's minor child LINDSEY WATSON have been resolved by 
separate order of the Fourth District Juvenile Court filed in said 
court on November 10, 1994. These were not issues at the trial on 
April 11 and 12, 1995, and will not be addressed in these findings. 
4. BACKGROUND OF THE PARTIES: Plaintiff is a medical doctor 
and Defendant is a nurse practioner. 
4.1. Plaintiff testified that he has been gainfully employed 
as a doctor since his graduation from medical school some 17 years 
prior to trial, but that he lost his employment on March 22, 1994 
and has been unable to locate employment since that time. Plaintiff 
testified that he did not want to practice other forms of medicine 
other than that which he had been practicing. Plaintiff testified 
that he could obtain other medical jobs, but that he would need 
some retraining. Plaintiff has made no effort to retrain. Defendant 
testified that some medical residents make up to $80,000 a year and 
that such jobs are available. 
4.2. Plaintiff testified that he probably can work at a 
hospital in Reno, Nevada, where he would make about $50,000 to 
$75,000 the first year, about $100,000 the second year and about 
$250,000 the third year. 
4.3. Defendant testified that she is a nurse practioner, but 
that during the marriage of the parties she remained at home and 
cared for her child from a prior marriage, the parties child and 
I: I n I lit i t f ' f , i 11,1 I i I I i l I I I i lit j i r i l l ( In | ) I .10 i I. (J i t S e p d i a i l O I l 
until August 1994, Datendant was involved in taking care of the 
ranch/farm business t|f t ho parties, ohtaininq pontiiiuinq medical 
t'durril ion , that, wlir luiil'i! me ent.ej I-ho job niaiket and caring ioi 
the eh ildren. In August, 1994, Defendant we : to work as a nurse 
practioner mak ing $45, 500 e ye i 
5 SEPARATE PROPERTY BROUGHT TO THE MARRIAGE:' The parties 
both had prior marriages and brought separate property into this 
man: iaqe , 
b i, At the time of the marriage of the parties, Plaintiff 
had an interest in a retirement plain, .i homo on Loafer Canyon Road, 
S d I e m i n dim d i n ! " in In ! y 11 ell ii«i I 11 I inn n i hlliij u q . Iliiii j inq I  h u m r i r r i a g e 
Plaintiff commingled I lie assets ot the retirement fund, revised the 
retirement fund and miido Defendant a trustee of the I'urid and made 
fiuibi:! 1 (in I" i (i I c .on 1.1 ibul i oiis I i In pi mi I i i>m marital, assets. 
nil! II1:)! dibits 2 and 2 1) The Loafer Canyon home was I mproved by the 
addition of a larqe metal hi'iMimj cop ^  f n «"•"•*«««' . II m \\ n\ rifs'eis, 
compJH ion (nil lha basement. dont» with muuLal assets, the purchase 
of a strip of land with marital assets to legalize the zoning! and 
redecorating of the e;«iMiJrni hrinn vni I li i assail.. 
'"»
 J
" AI the time nt thn marriage ot the parties, Defendant had 
Sf vii'dr e piopert. w*;* r 1 *•- • "* ^  -no u-^  ^ ^-^ ^  
fi . . 
Plai n c i r i a* .*h>*-. *>* v^n(aJ p a y m e n t s to jay - existing m o r t g a g e 
unt: : * he ro i™ - JH UI 
D<- *- hpr ^ Q . _' > u . Sin* < ..-! 
premarital home. (Exhibits 52 and 53). 
5.3. Defendant testified that the proceeds of the sale of her 
premarital home were given to Plaintiff to invest. Plaintiff 
produced part of Defendant's November 1991 deposit records which 
showed that $32,470.26 was deposited on November 20, 1991 into 
Defendant's separate bank account at Far West Bank and that the 
next day on November 21, 1991, a check for $20,000 was written from 
the account. (Exhibit 53) 
5.4. Plaintiff admitted that Defendant gave him some money to 
invest from the sale of Defendant's home and that he purchased 
horses with the money, however, Plaintiff now claims that the 
horses are marital property. The records produced by Plaintiff 
related to Defendant's separate bank account at Far West Bank *nd 
on November 21, 1991, and do not show records of checks paid after 
this date. Defendant's testimony in more creditable as to where 
these funds went. The records produced by Plaintiff support 
Defendant's testimony that she gave these funds to Plaintiff to 
invent. 
5.5. Since Plaintiff claims the horses as marital property, 
Defendant is entitled to be reimbursed for the $32,470.26 from 
Plaintiff's share of marital property. 
6. REAL PROPERTY: The parties' marital interest in real 
property is as follows: 
6.1. The parties purchase(Kseveral pieces of real property 
during the marriage. These purchases include 32 acres of land in 
Lake Shore, a barn and a ranch/rental home. The parties also 
|iu i i li.i - r / a } i 1 11 ." i l. i i f iyuu home 
which was n e c e s s a r y t o make t h e home meel z o n i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
b 7, The 12 a c r ^ s of p r o p e r t y wan s o l d and 1; lliiprn in p r e s e n t l y 
in iin i, hi, low in i mi 111 «i| >| H i IK i Hud e .1 y '>(> I
 (IH Ml ! 1 i mil I lie b a l e which is 
being held by Provo Abstract Company, 
M \ , The barn iinn ranch p r o p e i t y i, in i n n f t e i '"" iranoli ) \ i i i 
snl i l id tliii1 l into ol I l i i a J , bu t i lit" n a l e hail not yet, been c l o s e d 
b e c a u s e P i a L n t i l t lwii i ef used t o B I < J I I t h e c l o s i n g d o c u m e n t s , The 
r anch had been on I he i t :\ 1 e s t a t e mai I el I mi I III mi irill In-', at I In I m rm 
I I In Li i ill ami I In i i 'ul e s t a t e aqeid whe 111 s l e d t h e p r o p e r t y 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e p r e s e n t of t e r of $360,00(1 was a v a l i d o f f e r and 
s 1 in o 11 I 11 lie in I f *p 1 i i I i" | in in MI n |q e f, t i ui 11 i i 111 >| H 11 1 i»I I I  in 1,  11 N 11 ] 111 i 111.
 ri i) (| 
i wtucn snow t h e tax ( . 'va lua t ion on ranch in 1994 as $ 3 2 1 , 3 3 9 . II 
t h i s p r o p e r t y I s s o l d , a s i z a b l e debt w i l l a ! r , o be e l i m i n a t e d and 
1
 li | in t i e wi l l lint -i * <ju i "I | i niid inuiLj I In t e s t i m o n y showed t h a t 
t h e r e ; a r e two ( / ) d e b t s on t h e ranch ol ^ C
 r 000 and $123 ,000 , 
( E x h i b i t s ?? and "Ol i 'illiib l e a v e s a m a r i t a l equ i * ', n< **" I 0 * m in i f im 
dcdie I i IKJ I IM h e i Jo i ng c o s t and i c a J t o i t e e s . 
6 4, There i s a i r e a m a r i t a l i n t e r e s t in t lie Loa fe r Canyon 
home due In I h» i m p r o v e m e n t s a d d i t i o n , i la iin | m M liaieil 
c o r r e c t I lie i n i i n | I l a i i i i i i l I eel i i J ed Dial I. he naj i ow s t r i p ul 
land was p u r c h a s e d i o i $10,000 and t h e m e n t a l b u i l d i n g , i n c l u s i v e 
e t 1 a t i e r „ i e n d !* I,' , ( t u n I I K I < HUMS m \jf il e n ! i i m u i y a II Il Hi i II in Il 
i 
iiiixshmg the basement oi the remodeling, JEhir€er--aa-dou.bt/ made the 
R^AP^~*T mrrrti mor 1 • otnb 1 r The court finds that the marital interest 
i in I In I l iunJIi i ( " a n y i m lliiiiiiin i $ W ? > 0 0 0 . 
w y 
7. DEBTS: There is dispute about the present marital debts 
of the parties. Plaintiff claims that a substantial debt still 
exist somewhere in the neighborhood of $800,000. (Exhibit 5) When 
this action was filed, Plaintiff testified that he filed with the 
court a complete detailed list of all debts owned as of June 2, 
1992. (See Exhibit 23) At that date, the total debts were listed at 
$632,100. 
7.1. On August 9, 1993, just prior to the second separation of 
the parties, Plaintiff filed a credit application in which he list/**— 
all debts at $588,400. (Exhibit 26) Plaintiff testified that this 
statement properly represented the existing debts as of August 9, 
1993. 
7.2. Plaintiff also testified that a number of the debts 
listed in the June 2, 1992, court filing had been paid since that 
time as follows: 
June 2, 1992 $632,100 
9,000 Boat sold. 
12,000 Maui Condo paid. 
4,200 Zion VISA paid. 
800 Sears paid. 
3,500 Metal Building paid. 
20,000 Carter Shields paid. 
43,000 Motorhome sold. 
15,000 6 Horse trailer sold. 
3,500 Discovercard paid. 
15,000 Utah CV Credit Union paid. 
2,200 Associates Finance paid. 
1,600 Nebo Vet paid. 
53,000 30 acres sold. 
1,000 Tires paid. 
500 ZCMI paid. 
$434,300 Total Unpaid debt 
7.3. On June 2, 1992, the Loafer Canyon home had a debt of 
, 1 ' l i , II Il  ( h x 
Bold and ih . c- * . >. casino -: ' ". paid wnen the 
closi iig occi: •». uu uuue • oi $j.Gi,000 
and the ranch/rental ^nst . ^ p ^ r^ now 
$95,000 and /J ^ r.: * oroperty . * • • ; 0,000. 
(Exhi bi t: 35 ) i i i = ; : • • «• i 
the sale. 
„ 1 , with the debts of the Loafer Canyon home, the barn and 
I I I M i I M I I a 1 f i 11111 In In in i i' J J in i ihTt PI I h u m I In II n 11 «i II mm i I M I d e b t s , 
there remains using Llic June 2, 1992, schedule no more than a total 
mar i t a J debt oi $37, 3 Of). 
1
 '" i III' I  ii i i i II i I 1 mi MI c i n I < » i i j d l I 1 II I I M J| lu i in i .' | I lll *!,' i 111 d i" T i Ft i qn cd 
June HI 1992) al p a r a g r a p h K\ not 1o t a k e any a c t i o n t o f u r t h e r 
encumber t h e a s s e t s ml t h e p a r t i e s i >n October 2Q, l(^91 (orr iei 
s i q n e d NovembLM Mi I 'ii'i ] )
 |( | h r J J a i I i c . a t j i ' e n d I l i d t I In l u n c 11( I 'dt t 
o r d e r would remain in e f f e c t . 
*
7
 Ii lipf endanl t r s t i f ieri tha i dun iiii) I-hi attempt! In r e e n n r i le 
J n lijlli li)1*,1 Mini mid 19 9 J
 r bhe d i d nut uijinu l u encumber in 
i n c r e a s e t h e d e b t s of t h e p a r t i e s , T h i s i s s u p p o r t 1 by t h e f a c t 
t ha t P l a i n t i f f a q r e e d Mint MM Atiqiinl "i IIMCIM , r i • c J i t H p p U r n l IUII 
(biXhibil /'<>} was c o l l e c t and Midi I lie delil al I liat t i m e was 
$ 5 8 8 , 4 0 0 , If t h e r e I s a d d i t i o n a l deb t a s c l a i m e d by P l a i n t i f f , ml 
n'fri i in n r xvi\ mi in ' i f i I dl i f HI 11 I I In In in ' I "itl " inn 1 I In i in I nl»ei " ' I , 
1993 o r d e r s and a r e t.lie s e p a r a t e d e b t s oj P l a i.nti II • 
8 INCOME OF THE PARTIES: T - « •-.* — *• *<? a v e r a g e d 
i t i I;I ' s pe r sona ] :ii n some f :: r the 1 a : -o arri ve 
at an imputed income for him. (Exhibits 7, 8, 20, and 14) The court 
is required impute income to Plaintiff based on Cox v. Cox, 877 
P.2d 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and Utah Code §78-45-7.5(5)(6) and 
(7). 
8.1. Plaintiff's historical income for his professional 
medical practice is as follows: (Exhibits 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 
21 and 22.) 











8.2. Plaintiff's historical income from his personal income 
tax returns is as follows: (Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 20, 21, & 22) 











8.3. Plaintiff's gross monthly income for the purposes of 
child support and alimony is $30,225. Defendant's income for the 
purposes of child support and alimony is $45,500 a year or a gross 
of $3766.67 per month. (Exhibit 28) * 
permit parties to .maintain as much as possibJ e the same standards 
after the marri age as those enjoyed during the marriage. Savage v. 
Savage, 6 5 6 P. 2 d 1 01 ; (1i 9 8 3) 
"i" I Defendant's ability to maintain a standard ot living 
thai ahe hat! din nii| I IK. man laqe ii. I i ml lad h >' hoi tibility In (unn 
limited xncoiiie when i ompared to I lie income enjoyed by the parties 
during I lit* marriage. Plaintiff has the ability ti> earn income as 
s e t 1111 1 In I'liLii i n i« |ii| in in i in in III Il 11II i in mi J' inn in II I II II mi f n o p « . > d 
ot f i v e (5) y e a i s , 
e ' w v s h O W S t h ^ r * * v i r o p i p i v 
a 
a r e p e a t e d r e f u s a l t o pay ;- ** . *»u u r a e i e d a l imony y P j a . n * ; f r , 
and t h a t t h e r e i" M l i k e l i h o o d * h":* DefenaauL w i n ndve y i e a t 
C;IJ i J J i in I t y i m u i l l eel i in| p e r i o d i c a l imony payments . , 
"I1 I, The c o u r t i i nds t h a t t h i s I s a p r o p e r c a s e for t h e c o u r t 
t n o r d e r a lump suini pnyiiiont ot iiliniuny |nnniMiit In Bealb v . B e a l s , 
bUJ, 1", <!d Ub2 (Utah J H114 I . 
'',4, An alimony payment of $1,000 a month for h() months 
shoul d be or der l i i'U'i|' i payM'fr1 ^ 'ill1,' '). 
] :: CHILD SUPPORT: I ,.auitif£ should be j.equired to . o, hi] d 
support unti 1 the children i each r.he age of 3 8 years or graduate 
f: i c >m h :i gh s c h * > < : > Jl "i I m e " i C h-i i d-4ki^^^ 
^ia,.^i^ i n c o m e fniiJid-Jja--feb4-f^ 
-ed«£L. Plaintiff has been required t<5 pay child support of $1300 a 
month per child, hb^ever, this wris based on the fact that there was 
more than $632,100 inN^ehts at the time it was computed. The 
marital debt is virtually paad or will be paid. The children 
deserve a monthly s>*pport paymerrbvof $2000 per child for a total 
support payment of $4,000 
11. SUPPORT ARREARAGE: Plaintiff was ordered to pay to 
Defendant the sum of $1300 a month per child, plus $800 a month for 
alimony. (Orders of June 2, 1992 and November 16, 1993.) In March 
1994, Plaintiff stopped the payment of support. 
11.1 From March 1994 until trial, Defendant received her 
support payments from funds collected from an insurance company for 
the death of a horse owned by the parties. Defendant has accounted 
for these funds and the court approves the accounting. (Exhibit 50) 
11.2. The court finds that the following payments should have 


































11.3. From March 1994 until trial, Defendant's attorney paid 
to her from the insurance funds held in his trust (above) the 
following payments: (Exhibit 50) 
$ 5,475.00 Plaintiff's support 6/6/94 
$ 1,700.00 Plaintiff's support 6/23/94 
$ 3,400.00 Plaintiff's support 7/7/94 
$ 3,400.00 Plaintiff's support 8/10/94 
$ 3,400.00 Plaintiff's support 9/1/94 
$ 3,400.00 Plaintiff's support 10/1/94 
$ 3,400.00 Plaintiff's support 11/1/94 
$ 3,400.00 Plaintiff's support 12/1/94 
$ 2,896.35 Plaintiff's support 1/1/95 
$27,071.35 Total Paid 
11.3. Had these funds remained in trust, each party would 
have been entitled to one-half (1/2) of the funds. Plaintiff should 
receive credit against past due child support and alimony in the 
amount of $13,534.67 which is one-half of the insurance funds paid. 
(Exhibit 50) 
1.4. Judgment should be entered against Plaintiff and in 
favor of Defendant for past due child support and alimony in the 
amount of $40,865.33 ($54,400.00 less $13,534.67) 
12. RETIREMENT PLANS: Plaintiff had a retirement fund at the 
time of the marriage. (Exhibit 2) 
12.1. Evidence shows that during the marriage, Plaintiff made 
the following contributions to the plan from marital income: 
(Exhibit 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 16) 




























Total $14^23 /pj iLl O^f 
12.2. The evidence shows that the value of the retirement 
plan on December 31, of each year listed was as follows: (Exhibit 
2) 







12.3. There has been considerable buying and selling in the 
plan by Plaintiff who has exercised exclusive control over these 
activities. Plaintiff sold assets and purchased new assets in 
violation of this court's orders of June 2, 1992 and April 21, 1994 
which prohibited these activities. (See also Exhibit 2 for the 
years 1992, 1993 and 1994.) 
12.4. Defendant was made a trustees with Plaintiff on the 
retirement plan in 1992 which evidences an intent on the part of 
Plaintiff to give Defendant a full interest in the plan. (Exhibit 
27) 
12.5 The court finds that Defendant has a one-half (1/2) 
interest in the total value of the plan which one-half interest is 
$204,010 as of December 31, 1994. 
12.6. This finding is supported by Exhibits 10, 11, 12, 13, 
and 16, which show that a difference between the value of the plan 
in 1988 and the value of the plan on December 31, 1993, was 
$191,594 and actual contributions made by Plaintiff during the 
marriage of was $147,623. 
13. ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE: At the time of the second 
separation of the parties in August 1993, Plaintiff had substantial 
accounts receivable. He added to these each month and collected 
from them each month until March 1994. (Exhibit 1) 
13.1. In March 1994, Plaintiff stopped adding to these 
accounts receivable and started collecting them. The evidence shows 
that he collected the following: (Exhibit 1) 



























































13.2. From September 1993 until March 1994, Plaintiff had 
expenses in connection with these accounts receivable, but did not 
present evidence as to these expenses. The total collections from 
September 1993 through March 1994 was $465,871.34. Historically, 
Plaintiff has personally earned about 50% of his gross corporate 
income. This is obvious when Plaintiff's corporate income tax 
returns are compared with his personal income tax returns. 
13.3. It is equitable to give Plaintiff credit for 50% of the 
gross-income from September 1993 through March 1994, so that the 
marital net interest in these accounts receivable during September 
1993 through March 1994 is one-half of the $465,871.34 or 
$232,935.67. 
13.4. For the period of April 1994 until trial, Plaintiff 
collected $156,359.92. The total marital interest in the accounts 
receivable from September 1993 through March 1994 is $389,295.59 
which sum should be equally divided between the parties. 
13.5. Defendant is entitled to one-half of total marital 
interest in the accounts receivable or $194,647.79. 
13.6. Defendant is also entitled to one-half of any accounts 
receivable collected after trial. 
14. BANK ACCOUNTS: At the time of the second separation of 
the parties in August 1993, Plaintiff had a number of bank 
accounts. 
14.1. The evidence shows that these accounts were as follows: 
(Exhibit 25) 
Date Institution Amount 
8-31-93 Central Bank #2228 $15,489.25 
8-31-93 Central Bank #2236 68,497.61 
8-31-93 Zions Bank #607912 19,010.06 
8-31-93 Zions Bank #111600 4,986.72 
9-21-93 Central Bank #7231 5,545.92 
8-31-93 Mountain High C.R #248 20,000.00 
$133,529.56 
14.2. Defendant is entitled to one-half of these funds or 
$66,7,64.78. 
15. FUNDS HELD IN TRUST: There was $50,000 placed in the 
trust account of Defendant's attorney from the insurance on the 
death of a horse. Of this, each attorney received $10,000 and the 
balance was paid to Defendant for alimony and child support. (See 
paragraphs 11. ) 
15.1. There are also funds held in a trust account by 
Plaintiff's attorneys which represent the 1992 income tax refund of 
the parties in the approximate sum of $30,000 plus interest. At 
trial, Plaintiff did not provide an accounting for these funds and 
should be required to do so. 
15.2. The balance of the funds remaining from the 1992 tax 
returns should be divided equally between the parties. A total of 
$10,000 has been paid from this account so that there would be 
remaining about $20,000, plus interest. 
16. FUNDS HELD IN ESCROW: The parties sold 32 acres of 
property during the pendency of this action. The sale proceeds are 
presently held in the trust account of Provo Abstract. From these 
funds, each attorney has been paid $5,000. The balance of these 
funds should be equally divided between the parties and is 
discussed in paragraph 6.2 herein. 
17. PERSONAL PROPERTY: The personal property of the parties 
shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties shall 
agree upon this division within 30 days of entry of a final order. 
17.1. Should the parties be unable to agree, Plaintiff shall 
make two (2) lists for division of the personal property not 
specifically set forth herein. Defendant shall be allowed to select 
either of the two (2) lists prepared by Plaintiff as in her sole 
discretion she desires and the property on that list shall be 
awarded to her and the property on the other list awarded to 
Plaintiff. 
17.2. Should Defendant decline to select either list prepared 
by Plaintiff within 30 days of entry of this order, then all 
personal property shall be sold by a court appointed master and the 
proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties. The parties 
shall be permitted to bid on any item sold. The cost of the 
services of the master shall be paid from the proceeds of sale 
before distribution to the parties. 
17.3. Either party may request appointment of a master to 
sell the personal property not specifically set forth herein after 
30 d^ys from entry of a final order. 
17.4. The personal property will include the Snyder Oil 
Stock, the $60,000 interest which Plaintiff testified that he 
purchased in the Holiday Express outside of the interest held by 
the retirement plan discussed elsewhere in these findings, the St 
George Condo, and the HONO KAA Vacation Plan in Hawaii. 
17.5. Plaintiff purchased a Fleetwood Mobile Home on April 
22, 1992N^r $10,y5^l>Qs. He sold/thi^nobile home in August 1994 
for $12,000. ^""Tne proceecis^oj/ sale shotb^ d be/ divided equally 
between the parties. (Exhibit 41) 
18. ATTORNEY'S FEES & COSTS: Plaintiff has presented no 
evidence as to his costs and attorneys fees. Defendant has filed an 
affidavit of fees pursuant to court rules. 
18.1. The court has considered the factors set forth in Utah 
Code § 30-3-3 (1984), Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, (Utah 1980), and 
Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984) related to an award 
of attorneys fees and cost. 
18.2. The court finds the costs and fees of Defendant to be 
reasonable and necessary and that due to the difference in the 
earning abilities of the parties and considering all factors of the 
law, Plaintiff should contribute $20,000 toward the payment of 
Defendant's attorneys fees. This will leave Defendant with 
substantial attorneys fees to pay on her own. 
18.3. There is a debt owing to Gilbert and Stewart for an 
audit ordered by the court in the amount of $1120.00. This debt 
should be paid egually by the parties as ordered by the court on 
January 25, 1994, and should now be paid from the trust account of 
Plaintiff's attorneys prior to division of the funds held there. 
18.4. Defendant should be entitled to her costs pursuant to 
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
19. MEDICAL & DENTAL NEEDS OF THE CHILDREN: Defendant should 
maintain medical and dental insurance on the parties' minor 
children in her custody so long as available to her through her 
employment at a reasonable cost. 
19.1. Pursuant to Utah Code §78-45-7.15, if health insurance 
is a available to both parents at a reasonable cost and the 
children would gain more complete coverage, then both parents 
should be reguired to maintain insurance for the children. 
19.2. Plaintiff shall name his minor children as 
beneficiaries on any life insurance policies that he now as or 
obtains in the future sufficient to pay support in the event of his 
death. 
19.3. Plaintiff should pay all uninsured medical and dental 
needs of the children. 
20. DEBT TO DOCTOR GALE STRINGHAM: There is presently a debt 
owed to Dr. Gale Stringham for the therapy needs of the children 
and Defendant in the sum of $7912.00. (Exhibit 24) In open court 
on November 16, 1993, Plaintiff agreed to be responsible for the 
payment of these fees and the court so ordered. Plaintiff should be 
order to pay these fees and to hold Defendant harmless therefrom. 
21. TAX EXEMPTIONS: Plaintiff should be entitled to take 
LXN0SEY as a tax exemption if he is current in the payment of his 
alimon\ and child support for the tax year involved. Defendant 
should be entitled to take McCADE as a tax exemption. 
22. HORSE BUSINESS: The parties started a horse business 
during the marriage. On June 2, 1992, the court ordered in 
paragraphs 5 and 11 that Defendant operate that business, account 
for profits or losses and sell the horse and hay as she deemed 
proper. 
22.1. Defendant has accounted for the expenses and loss of 
the business and the court approves her accounting. Exhibit (48) 
22.2. During the last year that the parties resided together 
the farm business operated at a loss of about $106,000. Because of 
the income of Plaintiff and the tax advantage he received from the 
loss, the actual cash loss to the parties was about $56,000. 
22.3. Defendant has provided an accounting of the sales of 
horses as required by the court. (Exhibit 47) The court approves 
this accounting which showed total sales of $61,375. 
22.4. Defendant had additional income other than the horse 
sales of $7,90.98. (Exhibit 48) 
22.5. Defendant also provided the court with an accounting of 
her expenses in connection with the business and selling the horses 
which showed a total expenses of $71,763.56. 
22.6. The net loss of the horse business was $3,097.58. 
Compared to the 1992 losses of the business of about $106,000, this 
is a minimal overall loss for liquidation of the business. 
22.7. The liquidation of the horse was proper since horses 
are income consuming and not income producing. 
23. WATSON KENDAL INVESTMENT: Plaintiff established what he 
called a "family partnership" prior to the marriage. He put income 
into this partnership by paying it certain funds to handle the 
billing for his professional corporation. The partnership then 
hired the services of a collection company and retained part of the 
funds paid to it for the billing as income to the partnership. 
23.1. During the marriage, the following was paid to this 
partnership by Plaintiff's professional corporation: 
Year Gross Income 
1990 $ 48,637 
1991 $ 46,480 
1992 $ 48,505 
Total $143,622 
23.2. These were marital funds. The partnership is made up 
of Plaintiff's four (4) children from a prior marriage each of whom 
has a 24% interest. Plaintiff is the general partner and has a 4% 
interest. 
23.3. Defendant has custody of one (1) of the children who 
has a 24% interest in this partnership; to wit: LINDSEY WATSON. 
23.4. Plaintiff has sole control of this partnership. None of 
the children have ever put any funds into the partnership. 
23.5. The partnership owns some valuable art work. 
23.6. Defendant has as one-half interest in the funds placed 
into this partnership during the marriage which is one-half of 
$143,622 or $71,811. 
23.7. The art in Defendant's possession which is owned by 
this partnership (Exhibit 38) should be retained by Defendant in 
trust for LINDSEY WATSON who has a 24% in the partnership and who 
is in Defendant's custody. 
24. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION & OFF SETS: This is a proper case 
for an equal distribution of assets and debts between the parties. 
24.1. The assets of the parties should be divided as follows: 
Assets/Debt Marital Plaintiff Defendant 
Lake Shore 32 Acres $ 63,000 $ 31,500 $ 31,500 
Barn and ranch $105,000 $ 53,000 $ 53,000 
Loafer Canyon $ 50,000 $ 25,000 $ 25,000 
Retirement Plan $204,010 $102,005 $102,005 
Accounts Receivable $389,296 $194,648 $194,648 
Bank Accounts $133,530 $ 66,765 $ 66,765 
Tax refund $ 20,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 
Mobile Home $ 12,000 $ 6,000 $ 6,000 
Watson/Kendal $143,622 $ 71,811 $ 71,811 
Totals $1,120,458 $560,229 $560,229 
24.2. The court must provide for payment of the following 
debts: 
Gale Stringham: $ 7,912 
Marital debt $37,300 (From Exhibit 23) 
Gilbert and Stewart $ 1,120 
24.3. Plaintiff should pay the debt to Gale Stringham as he 
has been previously ordered to do so. Plaintiff should also pay the 
remaining marital debts of $37,300, but should be granted a credit 
against property awarded to Defendant. The debt to Gilbert and 
Stewart should be paid from the trusts funds held by Plaintiff's 
counsel prior to distribution. 
24.4. There is a loss in the farm/ranch business since the 
separation of the parties in the sum of $3,098. The parties should 
equally pay this lost. Since Defendant has already paid it, 
Plaintiff should reimburse her one-half or $1549. 
24.5. From Plaintiff's share of the marital property, he 
should pay the following: 
Funds from Defendant's premarital home: $32,470 
Lump Sum Alimony $60,000 
Support Arrearage $40,865 
One-half of the farm loss $ 1,549 
Attorneys Fees $20,000 
24.6. Plaintiff should receive credit against his share of 
the marital property awarded to Defendant for her one-half of the 
payment of the marital debts of $37,300. 
24.5. To the extent that Plaintiff has already collected and 
used funds awarded to Defendant herein or to the extent necessary 
to pay his child support and alimony arrearage and lump sum alimony 
award, Plaintiff should pay these funds to Defendant from his share 
of funds currently held in escrow by his attorney, from his share 
of funds being held by Provo Abstract, from his share of funds that 
will be paid from the closing of the Loafer Canyon Home and from 
his share of the funds to be received from the closing of the ranch 
and farm property• 
24.6. The off sets should result in the following net result. 
Plaintiff Defendant 
Assets $560,229 $560,229 
Debts 18,650 ( 18,650) 
Attorneys fees ( 20,000) 20,000 
Defendant's home: ( 32,470) 32,470 
Lump Sum Alimony ( 60,000) 60,000 
Support Arrearage ( 40,865) 40,865 
Farm loss ( 1,549) 1,549 
Totals $423,995 $696,463 
25. CONTEMPT: The court has entered a number of orders in 
this case to protect the parties and to insure that the debts were 
liquidated and funds secured until trial. Defendant has violated a 
number of the orders and admitted that he did so in open court. 
This has caused Defendant to expend considerable funds in costs and 
attorneys fees. This conduct on the part of Plaintiff makes the 
award of attorneys fees and the off sets proper. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. The court should confirm the prior decree of divorce. 
B. The court should confirm the prior order of the Fourth 
District Juvenile Court as to custody and visitation. 
C. In considering the relevant factors set forth in Pinion 
v. Pinion, 67 P.2d 265 (Utah 1937), Foreman v. Foreman, 176 P.2d 
144 (Utah 1946), Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) and Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the 
division of property in this case is equitable. 
D. The alimony award is mandated by the factors set out in 
Anderson v. Anderson. 138 P.2d 252 (1943), Frank v. Frank. 585 P.2d 
453 (Utah 1978), Martinez v. Martinez. 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991), 
and Savage v. Savage. 658 P.2d 1201 at 1205 (Utah 1983) 
Dated and signed this day of May, 1995. 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the undersigned mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing on the o2&T{ day 
of April, 1995, to Sam McVey and Daniel Goodsell, Attorneys at Law, 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84111. 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 924400816 
DATE: May 26, 1995 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for ruling after a trial was held in this matter on 
April 11 and 12, 1995 regarding the issues of child support, alimony, division of property and 
division of debts. Having reviewed and considered the evidence and testimony admitted at 
trial, having heard from counsel, and having reviewed the exhibits admitted and deeming itself 
fully advised, the Court makes the following findings: 
Findings of Fact 
1. Plaintiff has been a bona fide resident of the State of Utah and Utah County for more than 
three months prior to the filing of this action and the Court finds that jurisdiction and venue is 
proper. 
2. The parties were married on September 2, 1988, and divorced by bifurcated divorce on 
January 4, 1995. 
3. The issues of custody and visitation of the parties1 minor child McCADE WATSON and 
Plaintiffs minor child LINDSEY WATSON have been resolved by separate order of the 
Fourth District Juvenile Court. That court's findings were not issues at the trial on April 11 
and 12, 1995 and will not be addressed in these findings. 
1 
4. Employment. 
a. Plaintiff is a medical doctor and Defendant is a nurse practitioner. Plaintiff testified 
that he has been gainfully employed as a doctor since his graduation from medical school 
some 17 years prior to trial, but that he lost his employment on March 22, 1994 and has been 
unable to locate employment since that time. 
b. Plaintiff testified that he did not want to practice in another field of medicine other 
than that which he had been practicing. Plaintiff testified that he could obtain other medical 
jobs, but that he would need some retraining. Plaintiff has made no effort to retrain. 
Plaintiff testified that he has made inquiry into various anesthesiology positions and that he 
may be able to work at a hospital in Reno, Nevada, where he would make about $50,000 to 
$75,000 the first year, about $100,000 the second year and about $250,00 the third year. 
c. Defendant testified that some medical residents make up to $80,000 a year and that 
such jobs are available. 
d. Defendant testified that she is a nurse practitioner, but that during the marriage of 
the parties she remained at home and cared for her child from a prior marriage, the parties' 
child and Plaintiffs children from his prior marriage. From the date of the parties last 
separation until August 1994, Defendant was involved in taking care of the ranch/farm 
business of the parties, caring for the children, and obtaining continuing medical education so 
that she could re-enter the job market. In August, 1994, Defendant went to work as a nurse 
practitioner making $45,500 a year. 
5. Separate Property Brought to the Marriage: 
a. The parties both had prior marriages and brought separate property into the 
marriage. 
b. At the time of the marriage of the parties, Plaintiff had an interest in a retirement 
plan, interest in a time-share condominium, a home on Loafer Canyon Road, Salem, Utah and 
some household furnishings. During the marriage Plaintiff commingled the assets of the 
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retirement fund, revised the retirement fund and made Defendant a trustee of the fund and 
made substantial contributions to the plan from marital assets. The Loafer Canyon home was 
improved by the addition of a large metal building constructed with marital assets, completion 
of the basement done with marital assets, the purchase of a strip of land with marital assets to 
legalize the zoning, and redecorating of the existing home with marital assets. 
c. At the time of the marriage between the parties, Defendant had separate property 
which included a home, a vehicle and household furniture. Defendant rented the home when 
she married Plaintiff and used the rental payments to pay the existing mortgage until the home 
was sold on or about November 20, 1991. Defendant received $32,470.26 as her equity from 
the sale of her home. The Court finds that the proceeds from the sale of this home were 
given to Plaintiff to invest and that Defendant is entitled to reimbursement for this amount. 
6. Real Property: 
a. The parties purchased several pieces of real property during the marriage. These 
purchases included 32 acres of land in Lake Shore, a barn and a ranch/rental home. The 
parties also purchased a narrow strip of land next to the Loafer Canyon home in order to meet 
zoning requirements. 
b. The 32 acres of property was sold and the proceeds of $63,000 were placed in an 
escrow account held by Provo Abstract Company. 
c. A valid offer for purchase of the barn and ranch property had been obtained at the 
time of trial, but the sale had not yet been closed. The listing agent testified that the present 
offer of $360,000 was a valid offer and should be accepted. There are two debts remaining 
on the ranch of $95,000 and $123,000 which leaves a marital equity of $106,000 after 
deducting 10% for closing costs and realtor fees. 
d. There is also a marital interest in the Loafer Canyon home due to the 
improvements, additions and land purchased to correct the zoning. Plaintiff testified that the 
narrow strip of land was purchased for $10,000 and the metal building, inclusive of labor, cost 
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$32,000. There was no testimony as to the value of finishing the basement or the remodeling. 
The Court finds that the marital interest in the Loafer Canyon home is $40,000. 
7. Debts: Plaintiff claims that a substantial debt of approximately $800,000 still exists. At 
the time this action was filed, Plaintiff filed a complete detailed list of all debts owned as of 
June 2, 1992, listed in the amount of $632,100. 
a. On August 9, 1993, just prior to the second separation of the parties, Plaintiff filed 
a credit application in which he listed all debts at $588,400. The Court finds that this 
statement properly represented the existing debts as of August 9, 1993. 
b. With the selling of the Loafer Canyon home, the barn and the rental/ranch house, 
the court finds that using the June 2, 1992 schedule, there remains a total marital debt of 
$37,300. The Court finds that Plaintiff should be responsible to pay the entirety of this debt 
and any remaining marital debt. 
c. Plaintiff was ordered in the June 2, 1992 order (signed June 8, 1992) at paragraph 5 
not to take any action to further encumber the assets of the parties. The parties agreed on 
October 29, 1993 (order signed November 16, 1993) that the June 2, 1992 order would remain 
in effect. The Court finds that any further debts incurred by the Plaintiff in violation of the 
June 2 and October 29 orders are the separate debts of the Plaintiff. 
d. The home purchased by Defendant after the separation of the parties is her separate 
debt. 
8. Income of the Parties: 
a. The Court finds that Plaintiffs income will be imputed to him in the sum of 
$80,000, an amount which he could earn as a resident in retraining, should he choose to do so, 
or as an anesthesiologist, if he were willing to accept employment in a situation similar to the 
Reno, Nevada opportunity. At such time that Plaintiffs earnings increase the Court would 
consider a petition to modify child support based on a material change in circumstances. 
b. Based on Defendant's admission that she is currently employed as a nurse 
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practitioner, the Court finds that Defendant earns a salary of $45,500 per year. 
9. Alimony: Based on the respective needs of the parties, the marital debt of the parties, and 
both parties1 ability to be employed, the Court finds that an award of alimony to either party 
would not be equitable or necessary. 
10. Child Support: The Plaintiff should be required to pay child support based on the current 
Child Support Guidelines until the children reach the age of 18 years or graduate from high 
school, whichever is later. Counsel for Plaintiff should prepare the appropriate child support 
worksheets for submission to the Court. 
11. Support Arrearage: By the Orders of June 2, 1992 and November 16, 1993, Plaintiff was 
to pay temporary child support and alimony to Defendant in the amount of $1,300 per month 
per child for child support and $800 per month for alimony. From March 1994 until the time 
of trial, Defendant received her support payments from a trust holding insurance proceeds 
from death of a horse owned by the parties. The Court finds that judgment should be entered 
against Plaintiff for past due child support and alimony in the amount of $54,400, subject to 
an equitable offset for that amount paid by Plaintiffs interest in the trust account. 
12. Retirement Plans: 
a. Plaintiff had a retirement fund at the time of the marriage to which he made 
contributions during the marriage from marital income. 
b. The Court finds that during the parties' marriage Plaintiff made periodic 
contributions to the pension plan in the following amounts: 
Calendar Year 1988 $ 9,016.01 (deposited last qtr f88) 
Calendar Year 1989 $13,552.42 
Calendar Year 1990 $43,518.80 
Calendar Year 1991 $23,702.27 
Calendar Year 1992 $23,082.68 
Calendar Year 1993 $ 7,050.00 
Calendar Year 1994 -0-
c. The Court finds that the total amount of contributions made during the marriage 
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was $119,922.17 to which Defendant is entitled to a credit for one-half of that amount. The 
Court finds that it is fair and equitable that Defendant not be entitled to any appreciation or 
responsible for any loss on the account itself. 
13. Accounts Receivable: At the time of the marriage Plaintiff had approximately $200,000 
in accounts receivable. At the time of the separation of the parties and the termination of 
Plaintiffs employment, Plaintiff had approximately $200,000 in accounts receivable. The 
Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to retain $200,000 of accounts receivable as separate 
property, therefore Plaintiff is entitled to retain all the accounts receivable. 
14. Bank Accounts: The Court finds that any monies held in bank accounts belonging to the 
parties or Plaintiff prior to the separation should have been used to pay debts. As Plaintiff is 
to assume all debts he is entitled to any monies yet remaining in bank accounts. 
15. Funds Held in Trust: 
a. The Court finds that $50,000 from the insurance proceeds paid on the death of a 
horse was placed in the trust account of Defendant's attorney. Each attorney received $10,000 
of this, and the balance was paid to Defendant for alimony and child support. The Court finds 
that each party has a one-half share in the trust account ($50,000 minus attorney fees paid). 
b. There were also funds held in trust account by Plaintiffs attorneys representing the 
1992 tax refund of the parties in the sum of $20,234.00, which should be divided equally 
between the parties. 
16. Funds Held in Escrow: The parties sold 32 acres of property during the pendency of this 
action, and the proceeds are currently in a Provo Abstract trust account. From these funds, 
each attorney has been paid $5,000. The court finds that the balance of these funds should be 
divided equally between the parties. 
17. Personal Property: 
a. The Court finds that the personal property of the parties shall be equally divided 
between the parties. The parties shall agree upon this division within 30 days of entry of a 
6 
final order. The personal property will include the Snyder Oil Stock, the $60,000 interest 
which Plaintiff purchased in the Holiday Express, the interest in the St. George Condo, and 
the HONO KAA Vacation Plan in Hawaii. 
b. Should the parties be unable to agree, Plaintiff shall make two lists for division of 
the personal property from which Defendant shall select her choice of lists between the two 
lists. The property on that list shall be awarded to her and the property on the other list 
awarded to Plaintiff. Should Defendant decline to select either list, all personal property shall 
be sold and the proceeds divided equally. 
18. Attorney 's Fees and Costs: 
a. The Court finds that considering the difference in the earning abilities of the parties 
and all other factors in the relative positions of the parties Plaintiff should contribute $20,000 
toward the payment of Defendant's attorneys fees. 
b. Plaintiff should also pay one-half of the $1,120.00 debt owed to Gilbert and Stewart 
for the audit prepared in the matter. 
19. Medical and Dental Needs of the Children: Defendant should maintain medical and 
dental insurance on the parties1 minor children in her custody so long as available to her 
through her employment at a reasonable cost. Pursuant to Utah Code 78-45-7.15, if health 
insurance is available to both parents at a reasonable cost and the children would gain more 
complete coverage, then both parents should be required to maintain insurance for the 
children. Plaintiff shall name his minor children as beneficiaries on any life insurance policies 
he now has or obtains in the future. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be responsible to pay 
one-half of all uninsured medical and dental needs of the children. 
20. Debt to Dr. Gale Stringham: A $7,912.00 debt exists for the therapy needs of the 
children and Defendant. The Court finds that Plaintiff shall be responsible for payment of 
these fees, and Defendant will be held harmless therefrom with exception for the therapy costs 
incurred by Defendant personally, which she shall be responsible for. 
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21. Tax Exemptions: Plaintiff is entitled to take Lindsey as a tax exemption if he is current 
in the payment of his child support for the tax year involved. Defendant is entitled to take 
McCade as a tax exemption. 
22. Horse Business: By order of the Court on June 2, 1992, Defendant was deemed 
responsible for the horse business which was started by the parties during their marriage. 
Defendant sold the horses and accounted for her business expenses, the net loss of the 
business was $3,097.58, which loss Defendant should bear. The Court finds that liquidation 
of the horse business was proper. 
23. Watson Kendal Investment: 
a. Plaintiff had established a family partnership prior to the marriage which gained 
income by handling the billing for his professional corporation. The partnership hired the 
services of a collection company and retained part of the funds paid to it for the billing as 
income to the partnership. 
b. Plaintiff has a four percent interest in the partnership which is made up of 
Plaintiffs four children from a prior marriage, each of whom has a 24% interest. 
c. The Court finds that the payment to the partnership were for billing services 
rendered by the partnership, and that the children's interest in the partnership funds should not 
be disturbed. However, the Court finds that it would be just and equitable for Defendant to 
share in Plaintiffs interest in the partnership funds contributed during the marriage. During 
the marriage a total of $143,622 was paid to the partnership by Plaintiffs Professional 
corporation in which Plaintiffs four percent interest would be $5,744.88 to which Defendant is 
entitled to one-half or $2,872.44. 
d. The artwork belonging to the partnership and which is now in Defendant's 
possession shall be retained by Defendant in trust for Lindsey Watson who has a 24% interest 
in the partnership and who is in Defendant's custody, as well as for the other beneficiaries of 
the trust. 
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24. Equitable Distribution and Offsets: This is a proper case for an equal distribution of 
assets and debts between the parties. Where one party has both a credit and a debt to the 
other those amounts may be offset against each other. 
25. Contempt: Under the circumstances, the Court finds that it is not in the best interests of 
justice or of the marital estate to make a finding of contempt and impose penalties on the 
respective parties at this time. However, the Court may reserve any finding of contempt 
should there be any violations of the final Order of this Court. In this regard, the Court finds 
that although technical violations of court orders have occurred in this case, such violations 
have been relatively minor without substantial injury to the marital estate. 
26. Effective Date: The above findings shall be effective as of the date of trial in the matter 
rather than the date of separation. 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare a supplemental decree within 15 days of this 
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum 
decision has no effect until such order i$Q&/^Jj%Jfe£o 
Dated this 26th day of May, ^ 5 ^ > . V . . . . : C ' . ' A ^ 
cc: C. Robert Collins, Esq. 
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Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Thorn D. Walk (A5555) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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NOTICE OF OBJECTION TO 
PROPOSED SUPPLEMENT [SIC] 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924400816 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Plaintiff David W. Watson, by and through his counsel of record, hereby files his 
Notice of Objection to defendant's proposed Order. 
The bases for plaintiffs objection to defendant's proposed Order are more 
specifically set forth in plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration which addresses the issues 
and requests that the court not sign the proposed Order as submitted until it considers 
the issues in plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. 
DATED this j™ day of June, 1995. 
Samuel D. McVey 
Thorn D. Walk 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing 
NOTICE OF OBJECTION TO PROPOSED SUPPLEMENT [SIC] DECREE OF 
DIVORCE was mailed this 9^ day of June, 1995, by United States mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
C. Robert Collins 
Attorney at Law 
13444 N. 32nd Street, #19 
P.O. Box 54516 
Phoenix, AZ 85078-4516 
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Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Daniel V. Goodsell (A5704) 
Thomas D. Walk (A5555) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






RECONSIDERATION OR FOR A 
NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 924400816 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Plaintiff, David Warren Watson, hereby moves this Court, pursuant to Rule 59 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the equitable powers and jurisdiction vested 
in this Court, to reconsider its Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, more specifically, to reconsider and order a new trial of those 
certain points raised and addressed in plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of this Motion and filed herewith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \ j ^day of June, 1995. 
KIRTQN & McCQNKIE 
Samuel D. McVey 
Daniel V. Goodsell 
Thomas D. Walk 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR A NEW TRIAL was mailed this 
\^HK day of June, 1995, by United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
C. Robert Collins 
Attorney at Law 
13444 N. 32nd Street, #19 
P.O. Box 54516 
Phoenix, AZ 85078-4516 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OR FOR A 
NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 924400816 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Plaintiff, David Warren Watson, ("Dr. Watson") respectfully submits this 
memorandum in support of his Motion For Reconsideration or For a New Trial of certain 
points specified in the Court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, signed by the Court on May 26, 1995. 
I. Introduction 
This case involves a divorce proceeding between Dr. Watson and defendant, 
Suzanne Watson ("Mrs. Watson"). A two-day trial was held on April 11 and 12, 1995, at 
which time this Court heard the evidence presented by both sides with respect to the 
division and distribution of assets between Dr. Watson and Mrs. Watson. 
Thereafter the Court prepared and entered its Memorandum Decision and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on May 26, 1995 (the "Memorandum Decision"). 
After a complete review of the Memorandum Decision, Dr. Watson respectfully moves 
this Court to reconsider several points of the Memorandum Decision and to order a new 
trial on those issues. 
In addition, and pursuant to the Court's request, Mrs. Watson has prepared a 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, which more or less, is her proposed final order in this 
matter, to which Dr. Watson objected to the entry thereof and served notice of objection 
on or about June 9, 1995. 
II. Argument 
. . . [A] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following 
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in 
an action tried without a jury, the Court may open the 
judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment. . . . 
-2-
1 C ; I Q 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice; or 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against the law. 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
1. Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 4, Employment 
subparagraph (c): "Defendant testified that some medical residents make up to $80,000 a 
year and that such jobs are available." Mrs. Watson did not testify with any certainty that 
in fact medical residents make up to $80,000 a year nor that Dr. Watson could find 
employment as a resident and earn up to $80,000 a year. Mrs. Watson testified that she 
"thought" that a resident's salary would be about $80,000 per year. Dr. Watson testified 
that resident's salaries were not in that range and that if he could secure employment in 
his field of specialty, anesthesiology, that he would in all likelihood only be able to earn 
up to $50,000 in his first year.1 As a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by 
the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial on 
this issue. 
2. Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 8. Income of Parties, 
subparagraph (a): 'The Court finds that plaintiffs income will be imputed to him in the 
1
 In fact, first year residents at the University of Utah Medical Center are paid $31,125, seventh-year teaching 
fellows are paid $38,700, and there is no anticipated vacancy at any time in the near future. 
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sum of $80,000, an amount which he could earn as a resident in retraining, should he 
choose to do so, or as an anesthesiologist, if he were willing to accept employment in a 
situation similar to the Reno, Nevada opportunity." Dr. Watson testified that he is more 
than willing to accept employment as an anesthesiologist but no work is currently 
available. If the Court's intent was to impute the income of a resident to Dr. Watson, 
then the imputed income should be in the range of $31,125 to $38,700, the actual income 
range for residents at the nearest teaching facility. As a matter of law, this Finding of 
Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this Finding 
and order a new trial on this issue. 
3. Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact Paragraph 5, Separate Property 
Brought to the Marriage, subparagraph (c): "At the time of the marriage between the 
parties, defendant had separate property which included a home, a vehicle and household 
furniture. Defendant rented the home when she married plaintiff and used the rental 
payments to pay the existing mortgage until the home was sold on or about November 20, 
1991. Defendant received $32,470.26 as her equity from the sale of her home. The Court 
finds that the proceeds from the sale of this home were given to plaintiff to invest and 
that defendant is entitled to reimbursement for this amount." Mrs. Watson acknowledged 
that all of the funds she received upon the sale of this property were placed in her 
separate bank account. Mrs. Watson testified that Dr. Watson invested these funds, but 
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that she had no knowledge of what the funds were invested in. Dr. Watson testified that 
$20,000 of these funds was used to purchase two horses, with the approval of Mrs. 
Watson. Mrs. Watson was awarded all of the horses purchased or born during the course 
of the marriage and the proceeds from the sales thereof. Therefore, requiring a 
reimbursement from Dr. Watson to Mrs. Watson of these funds, which were used to fund 
the purchase of horses for which Mrs. Watson ultimately received the full benefit, results 
in a double recovery for Mrs. Watson. As a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is 
unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this Finding and 
order a new trial on this issue. 
4. Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 7. Debts, 
subparagraph (b): "With the selling of the Loafer Canyon home, the barn and the 
rental/ranch house, the Court finds that using the June 2, 1992 schedule, there remains a 
total marital debt of $37,300. The Court finds that plaintiff should be responsible to pay 
the entirety of this debt and any remaining marital debt." Dr. Watson was forced to incur 
additional debt just to service the debt on the real property. The monthly payments on 
the real property plus taxes and insurance amounted to nearly $8,000 per month and Dr. 
Watson was unemployed from March 1994 to the present. The only equitable distribution 
and disposition on this issue would have been to have the debt incurred to service the 
existing debt retired from the proceeds of the sale of the real property. As a matter of 
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law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore 
vacate this Finding and order a new trial on this issue. 
A. Subparagraph (c): "Plaintiff was ordered in the June 2, 1992 Order (signed 
June 8, 1992) at paragraph 5 not to take any action to further encumber the assets of the 
parties. The parties agreed on October 29, 1993 (Order signed November 16, 1993) that 
the June 2, 1992 Order would remain in effect. The Court finds that any further debts 
incurred by the plaintiff in violation of the June 2 and October 29 Orders are the separate 
debts of plaintiff." Dr. Watson erred in entering into more debt if the Court's intention, 
given his unemployment, was to direct that the assets be allowed to go to foreclosure. 
This Finding results in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and, as a 
matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should 
therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial on this issue. 
B. Subparagraph (d): "The home purchased by defendant after the separation 
of the parties is for separate debt." The Court did not address the source of funding or 
from whence the funds came for the $47,000 down payment which Mrs. Watson made on 
the home she purchased. It is obvious that the down payment had to come from marital 
assets since Mrs. Watson was not working outside of the home during the marriage and 
she had not yet become employed. The entire $47,000 downpayment was thus a marital 
asset and should have been divided between Dr. and Mrs. Watson. This Finding results 
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in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and, as a matter of law, this 
Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate 
this Finding and order a new trial on this issue. 
5. Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 11, Support 
Arrearage: "By the Orders of June 2, 1992 and November 16, 1993, plaintiff was to pay 
temporary child support and alimony to defendant in the amount of $1,300 per month per 
child for child support and $800 per month for alimony. From March 1994 until the time 
of trial, defendant received her support payments from a trust holding insurance proceeds 
from death of a horse owned by the parties. The Court finds that the judgment should be 
entered against plaintiff for past due child support and alimony in the amount of $54,400, 
subject to an equitable offset for that amount paid by plaintiffs interest into the trust 
account." The evidence supports the fact that Dr. Watson was unemployed during the 
entire period. Dr. Watson testified that he made his child support payments for March 
and paid $600 in April of 1994. Dr. Watson's testimony at trial supports the facts of 
these payments. Mrs. Watson became employed in August of 1994. This Finding does 
not address the equitability of requiring Dr. Watson to pay alimony while unemployed 
when Mrs. Watson was fully employed and when Mrs. Watson was receiving more than 
$1,000 a month rent on the ranch property while Dr. Watson was left to pay the 
mortgage. In this the Court erred as a matter of law. It would be most equitable to 
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offset monies received by Mrs. Watson from rent from the ranch house against any 
monies Dr. Watson would owe for back alimony and child support. This Finding results 
in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and, as a matter of law, this 
Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate 
this Finding and order a new trial on this issue. 
6, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 12. Retirement Plans, 
subparagraph (c): "The Court finds that the total amount of contributions made during 
the marriage was $119,922.17 to which defendant is entitled to a credit for one-half of 
that amount. The Court finds that it is fair and equitable that Defendant not be entitled 
to any appreciation or responsible for any loss on the account itself." As a matter of law 
the Court erred when it failed to consider appreciation and depreciation of the account. 
As a matter of law the Court should have considered both appreciation and depreciation 
and attributed those factors to the amount it awarded to both Dr. Watson and Mrs. 
Watson. As a result, this Court should order a new trial on this issue. 
?• Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 17. Personal 
Property, subparagraph (a): "The Court finds that the personal property of the parties 
shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties shall agree upon this division 
within thirty days of entry of a final order. The personal property will include the Snyder 
Oil stock, the $60,000 interest which plaintiff purchased in the Holiday Express, the 
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interest in the St. George condo and the Honokaa vacation plan in Hawaii." Dr. 
Watson's personal interest in the Holiday Express was $40,000. The $40,000 came from 
the Loafer Canyon home equity line loan. This Court has determined that there is a 
maximum of $40,000 marital interest in the home. Therefore, because this personal 
investment came solely from the proceeds generated by a primarily pre-marital asset, 
there should be no marital interest awarded to Mrs. Watson in this investment. In 
addition, the pay-off of the St. George condo and the purchase of the other St. George 
time-share condo also came from the home equity loan secured by the Loafer Canyon 
home. This Finding results in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets 
and, as a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this 
Court should therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial on this issue. 
8* Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 18. Attorney's Fees 
and Costs, subparagraph (a): "The Court finds that considering the difference in the 
earning abilities of the parties and all other factors in the relative positions of the parties, 
plaintiff should contribute $20,000 toward the payment of defendant's attorney's fees." 
Dr. Watson has incurred attorney fees in excess of those charged to defendant to defend 
himself in this action and against the charges of abuse leveled at him by Mrs. Watson. 
Under the terms in this Memorandum Decision, Dr. Watson will have to file bankruptcy 
because he will be left with an enormous debt and no way to pay it. This will result in 
-9-
Dr. Watson's inability to pay his own legal counsel while being required to pay for Mrs. 
Watson's legal counsel. Under the terms of the Memorandum Decision as proposed, 
Mrs. Watson may be awarded cash in excess of $210,000 and is in a better position to pay 
her own legal fees; conversely, Dr. Watson will file bankruptcy and be unable to pay his 
legal fees. This Finding results in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets 
and, as a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this 
Court should therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial on this issue. 
A. Subparagraph (b): "Plaintiff should also pay one-half of the $1,120 owed to 
Gilbert & Stewart for the audit prepared in the matter." Under the terms of the previous 
court Order, Dr. Watson paid half of the bill for the court-appointed auditor. Mrs. 
Watson simply refused to pay her half of the bill and now Dr. Watson is required to pay 
half of a bill she was directed to pay by previous court order. This Finding results in an 
inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and, as a matter of law, this Finding 
of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this 
Finding and order a new trial on this issue. 
9. Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact paragraph 20. Debt to Dr. Gale 
Stringham: "A $7,912 debt exists for the therapy needs of the children and defendant. 
The Court finds that plaintiff shall be responsible for payment of these fees, and 
defendant will be held harmless therefrom with exception for the therapy costs incurred 
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by defendant personally, which she shall be responsible for." This debt is the subject of 
another court action and should be resolved in that litigation. This court did not have 
before it the allegations of malpractice, etc. and further no exhibit regarding the debt 
allegedly owed to Dr. Stringham was admitted by the Court. This Finding results in an 
inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and, as a matter of law, this Finding 
of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this 
Finding and order a new trial on this issue. 
10. Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, paragraph 22. Horse Business: 
"By order of the Court on June 2, 1992, defendant was deemed responsible for the horse 
business which was started by the parties during the marriage. Defendant sold the horses 
and accounted for her business expenses, the net loss of the business was $3,097.58, which 
loss defendant should bear. The Court finds that liquidation of the horse business was 
proper." Mrs. Watson was ordered by this Court on more than one occasion to provide 
an accounting for the horse business. Mrs. Watson was also required to provide 
accounting documents to the auditor which she also failed to do. The accounting which 
Mrs. Watson presented to the court did not adequately address the proceeds from the 
sale of the horses, farm equipment, etc. or her expenses. Mrs. Watson made no attempt 
to provide a separate listing of expenses related to the horse business, she simply provided 
a list of all checks written from her account and in reaching the $3,097.58 deficit referred 
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to in the Memorandum Decision she listed as expenses: entertainment, RC Willey, spa 
dues, restaurants, clothing, gifts, expenses related to this action, etc. 
Mrs. Watson's "accounting" fails to account for the fact that more than $450,000 
was run through her Bank of American Fork checking account from the time of 
separation to the time of trial. During which time, Mrs. Watson received only $17,535.28 
from her employment. We believe that a more complete accounting would result in a 
finding that, in fact, Mrs. Watson did receive tens of thousands of dollars in excess of her 
costs when she liquidated the horses and farm equipment. 
This Finding results in an inequitable distribution and disposition of the assets and, 
as a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported by the evidence, and this Court 
should therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial on this issue. 
11. Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, paragraph 24. Equitable 
Distribution and Offsets: "This is a proper case for an equal distribution of assets and 
debts between the parties. Where one party has both a credit and a debt to the other, 
those amounts may be offset against each other." Dr. Watson fully supports this 
contention. However, under the terms of the Memorandum Decision he is left with 
overwhelming and inequitable distribution and disposition of the marital debt, and his 
accounts receivable, which the Court awarded to him, have been completely depleted in 
order to service the debt during the pendency of this proceeding while Mrs. Watson was 
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awarded cash in excess of $210,000. This Finding results in an inequitable distribution 
and disposition of the assets and, as a matter of law, this Finding of Fact is unsupported 
by the evidence, and this Court should therefore vacate this Finding and order a new trial 
on this issue. 
III. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, Dr. Watson respectfully requests that this Court grant his 
motion for reconsideration or for a new trial on the issues raised herein and as set forth 
above. 
AO3 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [ J J day of June, 1995. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Samuel D. McVey 
Daniel V. Goodsell 
Thomas D. Walk 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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1 hereby certify thai a trae and coned copy of the attached and. foregoing 
MEMORANDUM OF POINT AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR A NEW TRIAL was mailed this ( ifr^ 
day of June, 1995, by United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
C. Robert Collins 
Attorney at Law 
13444 N. 32nd Street, #19 
P.O. Box 54516 
Phoenix, AZ 85078-4516 




Fourth Judicial District Court of 
"tah (ffilintf State of Utah, 
— Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






CASE NO. 924400816 
DATE: July 6, 1995 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court upon a notice to submit for consideration of 
Plaintiffs Objection to the Proposed Supplement[sic] Decree of Divorce submitted in this case, 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration or For a New Trial and Defendant's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees. Having received and considered Plaintiffs objection and motion, along with 
Defendant's motion, together with memoranda both in support and in opposition to the 
objection and motions, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs motion as well as Defendant's 
motion and overrules the objection, this day signing the Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Decree of Divorce submitted in this matter. 
Dated this 6th day of July, 1995. 
BY^tf^COURl^ 
HORDING, JUD 
cc: C. Robert Collins, Esq. 
Samuel D. McVey, Esq. 
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C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Utah Bar #5455 
13444 North 32nd Street, Suite 19 
P.O. Box 54516 
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(602) 788-7227 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 





SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 924400816 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the Court for 
trial on April 11 and 12, 1995, regarding the issues of child 
support, alimony, division of property and division of debts, the 
Court having reviewed and considered the evidence and testimony 
admitted at trial, having heard from counsel, having reviewed the 
exhibits admitted and deeming itself fully advised, makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. JURISDICTION & VENUE: Plaintiff was a bona fide resident 
of the State of Utah and Utah County for more than three (3) months 
prior to the filing of this action. The Court finds that 
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jurisdiction and venue are proper in the above entitled court. 
2. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE: The parties were married on 
September 2, 1988 and divorced by bifurcated decree on January 4, 
1995. 
3. . CUSTODY AND VISITATION: The issues of custody and 
visitation of the parties' minor child McCADE WATSON and 
Plaintiff's minor child LlNDSEY WATSON have been resolved by 
separate order of the Fourth District Juvenile Court. That courts 
findings were not at issue at the trial on April 11 and 12, 1995 
and will not be addressed in these findings. 
4. EMPLOYMENT: 
a. Plaintiff is a medical doctor and Defendant is a nurse 
practitioner. Plaintiff testified that he has been gainfully 
employed as a doctor since his graduation from medical school 
some 17 years prior to trial, but that he lost his employment on 
March 22, 1994 and has been unable to locate employment since that 
time. 
b. Plaintiff testified that he did not want to practice in 
another field of medicine other than that which he had been 
practicing. Plaintiff testified that he could obtain other medical 
jobs, but that he would need some retraining. Plaintiff has made no 
effort to retrain. Plaintiff testified that he had made inquiry 
into various anesthesiology positions and that he may be able to 
work at a hospital in Reno, Nevada, where he would make about 
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$50,000 to $75,000 the first year, about $100,000 the second year 
and about $250,000 the third year. 
c. Defendant testified that some medical residents make up 
to $80,000 a year and that such jobs are available. 
d. Defendant testified that she is a nurse practitioner, 
but that during the marriage of the parties she remained at home 
and cared for her child from a prior marriage, the parties child 
and Plaintiff's children from his prior marriage. From the date of 
the parties last separation until August 1994, Defendant was 
involved in taking care of the ranch/farm business of the parties, 
caring for the children and obtaining continuing medical education 
so that she could re-enter the job market. In August, 1994, 
Defendant went to work as a nurse practitioner making $45,500 a 
year. 
5. SEPARATE PROPERTY BROUGHT TO THE MARRIAGE: 
a. The parties both had prior marriages and brought separate 
property into this marriage. 
b. At the time of the marriage of the parties, Plaintiff had 
an interest in a retirement plan, interest in a time share 
condominium, a home on Loafer Canyon Road, Salem, Utah and some 
household furnishing. During the marriage Plaintiff commingled the 
assets of the retirement fund, revised the retirement fund, made 
Defendant a trustee of the fund and made substantial contributions 
to the plan from marital assets. The Loafer Canyon home was 
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improved by the addition of a large metal building constructed with 
marital assets, completion of the basement done with marital 
assets, the purchase of a strip of land with marital assets to 
legalize the zoning, and redecorating of the existing home with 
marital ^ assets. 
c. At the time of the marriage of the parties, Defendant had 
separate property which included a home, a vehicle and household 
furniture. Defendant rented the home when she married Plaintiff 
and used the rental payments to pay the existing mortgage until the 
home sold which was on or about November 20 1991. Defendant 
received $32,470.26 as her eguity from the sale of her premarital 
home. The Court finds that the proceeds from the sale of this home 
were given to Plaintiff to invest and the Defendant is entitled to 
reimbursement of this amount. 
6. REAL PROPERTY: 
a. The parties purchase several pieces of real property 
during the marriage. These purchases include 32 acres of land in 
Lake Shore, a barn and a ranch/rental home. The parties also 
purchase a narrow strip of land next to the Loafer Canyon home in 
order to meet zoning requirements. 
b. The 32 acres of property was sold and the proceeds of 
$63,000 from the sale were placed in an escrow account held by 
Provo Abstract Company. 
c. A valid offer for purchase of the barn and ranch property 
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had been obtained at the time of trial, but the sale had not yet 
been closed. The listing agent testified that the present offer of 
$360,000 was a valid offer and should be accepted. There are two 
(2) debts remaining on the ranch of $95,000 and $123,000 which 
leaves a marital equity of $106,000 after deducting 10% for closing 
costs and realtor fees. The parties should equally divide this 
equity. 
d. There is also a marital interest in the Loafer Canyon 
home due to the improvements, additions and land purchased to 
correct the zoning. Plaintiff testified that the narrow strip of 
land was purchased for $10,000 and the mental building, inclusive 
of labor, cost $32,000. There was no testimony as to the value of 
finishing the basement or the remodeling. The court finds that the 
marital interest in the Loafer Canyon home is $40,000. 
7. DEBTS: Plaintiff claims that a substantial debt of 
approximately $800,000 still exist. At the time this action was 
filed, Plaintiff filed a complete detailed list of all debts owned 
as of June 2, 1992 in the amount of $632,100. 
a. On August 9, 1993, just prior to the second separation of 
the parties, Plaintiff filed a credit application in which he 
listed all debts at $588,400. The court finds that this statement 
properly represented the existing debts as of August 9, 1993. 
b. With the selling of the Loafer Canyon home, the barn and 
the rental/ranch house, the court finds that using the June 2, 
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1992, schedule there remains a total marital debt of $37,300. The 
Court finds that Plaintiff should be responsible to pay the 
entirety of this debt and any remaining marital debts. 
c. Plaintiff was ordered in the June 2, 1992, order (order 
signed June 8, 1992) not to take any action to further encumber the 
assets of the parties. The parties agreed on October 29, 1993 
(order signed November 16, 1993), that the June 2, 1992 order would 
remain in effect. The court finds that any further debt incurred 
by Plaintiff in violation of the June 2, 1992 and the October 29, 
1993 orders are the separate debts of Plaintiff. 
d. The home purchased by Defendant after the separations of 
the parties is her property and her separate debt. 
8. INCOME OF THE PARTIES; 
a. The court finds that the Plaintiff's income will be 
imputed to him in the sum of $80,000, a amount which he could earn 
as a resident in retraining should he chose he to do so or as an 
anesthesiologist, if he were willing to accept employment in a 
situation similar to the Reno, Nevada, opportunity. At such time as 
Plaintiff's earnings increase, the Court would consider a petition 
to modify child support based on a material change in 
circumstances. 
b. Based on Defendant's admission that she is employed as a 
nurse practitioner, the Court finds that Defendant earns a salary 
of $45,500 a year. 
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9. ALIMONY: Based on the respective needs of the parties, 
the marital debt of the parties and both parties' ability to be 
employed, the Court finds that an award of alimony to either party 
would not be equitable or necessary. 
10^ CHILD SUPPORT: Plaintiff should be required to pay child 
support base upon the current Child Support Guidelines until the 
children reach the age of 18 years or graduate from high school 
whichever is later. Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare the 
appropriate child support work sheet for submission to the court. 
11. SUPPORT ARREARAGE: By the orders of June 2, 1992 and 
November 16, 1993, Plaintiff was ordered to pay to Defendant 
temporary child support and alimony in the amount of $1300 per 
month per child for child support and $800 a month for alimony. 
From March 1994, until the time of trial, Defendant received her 
support payments from a trust account holding the proceeds from an 
insurance company for the death of a horse owned by the parties. 
The Court finds that judgment should be entered against Plaintiff 
and in favor of Defendant for past due child support and alimony in 
the amount of $54,400.00, subject to an equitable off set for the 
amount paid by Plaintiff's interest in the trust account which was 
$13,534.67, for a net judgment of $40,865.33. 
12. RETIREMENT PLANS: 
a. Plaintiff had a retirement fund at the time of the 
marriage to which he made contributions during the marriage from 
marital income. 
b. The Court finds that during the parties' marriage, 
Plaintiff made periodic contributions to the pension plan in the 
following amounts: 
1988 $ 9,016.01 (deposited last quarter 1988) 
1989 $ 13,552.42 
1990 $ 43,518.80 
1991 $ 23,702.27 
1992 $ 23,082.68 
1993 $ 7,050.00 
1994 $ none 
c. The Court finds that the total contributions made during 
the marriage was $119,922.17 to which Defendant is entitled to a 
credit for one-half the amount or $59,961.09. The Court finds that 
it is fair and equitable that Defendant not be entitled to any 
appreciation or responsible for any loss on the account itself. 
13. ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE: At the time of the marriage, 
Plaintiff had approximately $200,000 in accounts receivable. At the 
time of the separation of the parties and the termination of 
Plaintiff's employment, Plaintiff had approximately $200,000 in 
accounts receivable. The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to 
retain $200,000 of the accounts receivable as separate property, 
therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to retain all of the account's 
receivable. 
14. BANK ACCOUNTS: The Court finds that any money held in 
bank accounts belonging to the parties or to Plaintiff prior to the 
separation should have been used to pay debts. As Plaintiff is to 
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assume all debts, he is entitled to any money yet remaining in his 
bank accounts. 
15. FUNDS HELD IN TRUST: 
a. The court finds that $50,000 from the insurance proceeds 
paid on the death of a horse was placed in the trust account of 
Defendant's attorney- Each attorney received $10,000 of this and 
the balance was paid to Defendant for alimony and child support. 
The Court finds that each party has a one-half share in the trust 
account. ($50,000 minus attorneys fees paid). 
b. There were also funds held in a trust account by 
Plaintiff's attorneys representing the 1992 income tax refund of 
the parties in the sum of $20,234 which should be divided equally 
between the parties. 
16. FUNDS HELD IN ESCROW: The parties sold 32 acres of 
property during the pendency of this action and the proceeds are 
currently in the trust account of Provo Abstract. From these funds, 
each attorney has been paid $5,000. The Court finds that the 
balance of these funds should be equally divided between the 
parties. 
17. PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
a. The Court finds that the personal property of the parties 
shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties shall 
agree upon this division within 30 days of entry of a final order. 
The personal property will include the Snyder Oil Stock, the 
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$60,000 interest which Plaintiff purchased in the Holiday Express, 
the interest in the St George Condo, and the HONO KAA Vacation Plan 
in Hawaii. 
b. Should the parties be unable to agree, Plaintiff shall 
make two (2) lists for division of the personal property from which 
Defendant shall select her choice of list between of the two (2) 
lists. The property on that list shall be awarded to her and the 
property on the other list awarded to Plaintiff. Should Defendant 
decline to select either list, all personal property shall be sold 
and the proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties. 
18. ATTORNEY'S FEES & COSTS; 
a. The Court finds that considering the difference in the 
earning abilities of the parties and all other factors in the 
relative position of the parties, Plaintiff should contribute 
$20,000 toward the payment of Defendant's attorneys fees. 
b. Plaintiff should also pay one-half of the $1120.00 owed 
to Gilbert and Stewart for the audit prepared in the matter. 
19. MEDICAL & DENTAL NEEDS OF THE CHILDREN: Defendant should 
maintain medical and dental insurance on the parties' minor 
children in her custody so long as available to her through her 
employment at a reasonable cost. Pursuant to Utah Code §78-45-
7.15, if health insurance is a available to both parents at a 
reasonable cost and the children would gain more complete coverage, 
then both parents should be required to maintain insurance for the 
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children. Plaintiff shall name his minor children as beneficiaries 
on any life insurance policies that he now has or obtains in the 
future. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be responsible for 
payment of one half of all uninsured medical and dental needs of 
the children. 
20. DEBT TO DOCTOR GALE STRINGHAM: A debt of $7912.00 exist 
for the therapy needs of the children and Defendant. The Court 
finds that the Plaintiff shall be responsible for the payment of 
these fees and Defendant should be held harmless therefrom with the 
exception for the therapy costs incurred by Defendant personally, 
she shall be responsible to pay. 
21. TAX EXEMPTIONS: Plaintiff is entitled to take LINDSEY as 
a tax exemption if he is current in the payment of his child 
support for the tax year involved. Defendant is entitled to take 
McCADE as a tax exemption. 
22. HORSE BUSINESS: By order of the Court on June 2, 1992, 
Defendant was deemed responsible for the horse business that was 
started by the parties during their marriage. Defendant sold the 
horse and accounted for the business expenses, the net loss of the 
business was $3,097.58 which loss Defendant should bear. The Court 
finds that liquidation of the horse business was proper. 
23. WATSON KENDAL INVESTMENT: 
a. Plaintiff had established a family partnership prior to 
the marriage which gained income by handling the billing for his 
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professional corporation. The partnership hired the services of a 
collection company and retained part of the funds paid to it for 
the billing as income to the partnership. 
b. Plaintiff has a 4% interest in the partnership which is 
made uprof Plaintiff's four (4) children from a prior marriage, 
each of whom has a 24% interest. 
c. The Court finds that the payments to the partnership were 
for billing service rendered by the partnership and that the 
children's interest in the partnership funds should not be 
disturbed. However, the court finds that it would be just and 
equitable for Defendant to share in Plaintiff's interest in the 
partnership funds contributed during the marriage. During the 
marriage a total of $143,622 was paid to the partnership by 
Plaintiff's professional corporation in which Plaintiff's 4% 
interest would be $5,744.88 to which Defendant is entitled to one 
half or $2,872.44. 
d. The art work belonging to the partnership and which is 
now in Defendant's possession, shall be retained by Defendant in 
trust for LINDSEY WATSON who has a 24% interest in the partnership 
and who is in Defendant's custody as well as for the other 
beneficiaries of the partnership. 
24. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION & OFF SETS: This is a proper case 
for an equal distribution of assets and debts between the parties. 
Where one party has both credits and debts to the other, those 
amounts may be off set against each other. 
25. CONTEMPT: Under the circumstance, the Court finds that 
it is not in the best interest of justice or of the marital estate 
to make a finding of contempt and impose penalties on the 
respective parties at this time. However, the Court may reserve any 
findings of contempt should there me any violations of the final 
order of this court. In this regard, the Court finds that although 
technical violations of court orders have occurs in this case, such 
violations have been relatively minor without substantial injury to 
the marital estate. 
26. EFFECTIVE DATE: The above findings shall be effective as 
of the date of trial in this matter rather than the date of 
separation. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. The court should confirm the prior decree of divorce. 
B. The court should confirm the prior order of the Fourth 
District Juvenile Court as to custody and visitation. 
C. The division of property and allocation of debts in this 
case is fair and equitable. 
D. Child support should be as herein set forth. 
E. Neither party should receive alimony from the other. 
F. Plaintiff should contribute attorneys fees as herein set 
forth. 
G. All other matters should be as herein ordered. 
Dated and signed this ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, on the 31st day of May, 
1995, to Plaintiff's Attorney at: 
SAMUEL D. McVEY 
DANIEL GOODSELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT., 84111 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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Phoenix, Arizona, 85078—4516 
(602) 788-7227 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
DAVID WARREN WATSON, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
SUZANNE WATSON, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENT*DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924400816 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the Court for 
trial on April 11 and 12, 1995, regarding the issues of child 
support, alimony, division of property and division of debts, the 
Court having reviewed and considered the evidence and testimony 
admitted at trial, having heard from counsel, having reviewed the 
exhibits admitted, having made its FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW and deeming itself fully advised, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that order of the Fourth 
District Juvenile Court related to custody and visitation shall be 
and is hereby confirmed and is this court's prior Decree of 
Divorce. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment 
against Plaintiff for $32,470.26 which represent the eguity from 
the sale of her premarital home which money was given to Plaintiff. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment 
against Plaintiff for $20,000.00 which represent her share of the 
marital equity in the Loafer Canyon home. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay the marital 
debts of the parties and shall hold Defendant harmless therefrom. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay any debt he has 
individually incurred since June 2, 1992 and shall hold Defendant 
harmless from same unless otherwise set forth herein. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall pay any debt she 
has individually incurred since June 2, 1992 and shall hold 
Plaintiff harmless from same unless otherwise set forth herein. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that neither party shall pay alimony to 
the other party. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay child support 
to Defendant for the two (2) minor children in her custody in the 
sura of $482.24 per month per child for a total of $964.48 a month 
commencing May 1, 1995, and each month thereafter until the 
children reach the age of 18 years or graduate from high school 
whichever is later. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment 
against Plaintiff for $40,865.33 which represent past due child 
support and alimony under the temporary orders of the court. 
($54,400.00 less Plaintiff's interest in the trust account which 
was $13,534.67, for a net judgment of $40,865.33.) 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment 
against Plaintiff for $59,961.09 which represent one half of the 
marital interest of $119,922.17 in Plaintiff's retirement plan. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment 
against Plaintiff for $30,000.00 which represent one half of the 
marital investment made by Plaintiff in the Holiday Express Motel 
in Spanish Fork, Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall be entitled to the 
accounts receivable in his professional corporation and the bank 
accounts in his name or that of his professional corporation as his 
sole and separate property. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall be entitled to the 
bank accounts in her name or under her control as her sole and 
separate property. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall equally divide 
$20,234.00 held in a trust account by Plaintiff's attorneys for the 
1992 income tax refund of the parties. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall receive one half 
of the funds now being held in the trust account of Provo Abstract 
in the approximate amount of $63,000 or $31,500 each. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall equally divide 
the marital equity of $106,000 or approximately $53,000 each after 
deducting 10% for closing cost and realtor fees from the sale of 
the farm/ranch property. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the personal property of the 
parties shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties 
shall agree upon this division within 30 days of entry of a final 
order. The personal property will include the Snyder Oil Stock, the 
interest in the St George Condo, and the HONO KAA Vacation Plan in 
Hawaii. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that should the parties be unable to 
agree on the distribution of the personal property, Plaintiff shall 
make two (2) lists for division of the personal property from which 
Defendant shall select her choice of lists between of the two (2) 
lists. The property list selected by Defendant shall be awarded to 
her and the property on the other list shall awarded to Plaintiff. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that should Defendant decline to select 
either personal property list, all personal property shall be sold 
and the proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment 
against Plaintiff for $20,000.00 which represent attorneys fees 
awarded to Defendant herein. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall maintain medical 
and dental insurance on the parties' minor children in her custody 
so long as available to her through her employment at a reasonable 
cost. Pursuant to Utah Code §78-45-7.15, if health insurance is a 
available to both parents at a reasonable cost and the children 
would gain more complete coverage, then both parents shall be 
required to maintain insurance for the children. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall name his minor 
children as beneficiaries on any life insurance policies that he 
now has or obtains in the future. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff and Defendant shall each 
be responsible for payment of one half of all uninsured medical and 
dental needs of the children. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay to Dr. Gale 
Stringham the sum of $5040.00 for the therapy needs of the children 
and shall hold Defendant harmless therefrom. Defendant shall be 
responsible for any therapy costs personally incurred to Dr. Gale 
Stringham. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall be entitled to take 
LINDSEY WATSON as a tax exemption if he is current in the payment 
of his child support at the end of the tax year involved and 
Defendant shall be entitled to take McCADE as a tax exemption. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's accounting of the horse 
business is approved by the Court. Defendant shall bear the loss of 
the business of $3,097.58. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have judgment 
against Plaintiff for $2,872.44 which represents one half of the 
marital interest in WATSON KENDAL INVESTMENT. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the art work belonging to WATSON 
KENDAL INVESTMENT which is now in Defendant's possession, shall be 
retained by Defendant in trust for LINDSEY WATSON who has a 24% 
interest in the partnership and who is in Defendant's custody as 
well as for the other beneficiaries of the trust. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to find either 
party in contempt of court, however, the Court reserves 
jurisdiction to find contempt should there be any violations of 
this order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the effective date of this decree 
shall be the date of the trial in this matter rather than the date 
of separation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall receive no payments 
under this supplement decree until all judgments awarded to 
Plaintiff herein are fully paid. 
Dated and signed this 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, on the 31st day of May, 
1995, to Plaintiff's Attorney at: 
SAMUEL D. MCVEY 
DANIEL GOODSELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT., 84111 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
